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Recent literature has shown that skills are not only essential for the development
of successful adults, but also that they are malleable and prone to be affected by
many experiences. In this dissertation, I explore these two sides of skills and develop-
ment. I use skills as a vehicle to study the consequences victimization events have on
adult outcomes, and as the channels through which the gaps in those adult outcomes
materialize. I use novel longitudinal surveys and rely on an empirical strategy that
recognizes skills as latent constructs. First, I estimate the treatment effects being
bullied and being a bully in middle school have on several outcomes measured at age
18. I find that both, victims and bullies, have negative consequences later in life.
However, they differ in how non-cognitive and cognitive skills palliate or exacerbate
these consequences. Then, I move on to investigate the channels that open the gaps
in adult outcomes between victims and non-victims. I estimate a structural dynamic
model of skill accumulation. I allow skill formation to depend on past levels of skills,
parental investment and bullying. Also, I allow bullying itself to depend on each stu-
dent’s past skills and those of his or her classmates. I find that being bullied at age
14 depletes current skill levels by 14% of a standard deviation for the average child.
This skill depletion causes the individual to become 25% more likely to experience
bullying again at age 15. Therefore bullying triggers a self-reinforcing mechanism
that opens an ever-growing skill gap that reaches about one standard deviation by
age 16. Finally, under the light of skills, I explore how other type of victimization,
namely discrimination against sexual minorities, creates income gaps against non-
heterosexual workers. I estimate a structural model that relies on the identification
of unobserved skills to allow schooling choices, occupational choices and labor market
outcomes to be endogenously determined and affected by the sexual preference of
the worker. The results show that difference in skills, observable characteristics, and
tastes for tertiary education and type of occupation, contribute to at least half of the
income gaps non-heterosexuals face.
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1. BULLYING IN TEENAGERS, THE ROLE OF COGNITIVE AND
NON-COGNITIVE SKILLS 1
1.1 Introduction
Bullying is a behavioral phenomenon that has been placed under the spotlight in
many parts of the world in recent years. Bullying is by no means new, but it has
increasingly become a behavioral issue among young people. Frequent cases of sui-
cide in school and college aged kids around the world keep reminding society of the
perils and immense costs that bullying victims—and communities in general—have
to bear. This phenomenon has been reinforced by the availability of new communica-
tion technologies, specially among young people, who are often the most permeable
by these new technologies. Crime and bullying are among those societal features than
can potentially be transformed by the flood of information and connectivity. Cyber-
crime and cyberbullying are therefore behavior alternatives that were not available
to previous generations.
Psychologists have defined a bullying victim as a person that is repeatedly and
intentionally exposed to injury or discomfort by others (Olweus, 1997). Injury or
discomfort can be caused by violent contact, by insulting, by communicating private
or inaccurate information and other unpleasant gestures like the exclusion from a
1 THIS CHAPTER WAS AUTHORED JOINTLY WITH SERGIO URZÚA
group. Olweus (1997) indicates that bullying happens in environments where there
are imbalances of power, and Faris and Felmlee (2011) suggest that bullying thrive
in contexts where there is the need to show peer group status. Not surprisingly,
schools are the perfect setting for bullying. The combination of peer pressure with
the multidimensional heterogeneity of students together with a sense of self-control
still not fully developed, makes schools a petri dish for bullying. Furthermore, cyber-
bullying has escalated this recipe for disaster to new levels. The ability to instantly
and widely convey information to peers facilitates harassment. In the virtual world,
the victim can be attacked from multiple directions leaving him or her defenseless. In
addition, cyberbullying can sometimes provide anonymity to the perpetrators, giving
an advantage that allows them to be even more hurtful.
Bullying is not only widespread, but very costly.2 According to government statis-
tics from stopbullying.gov, 160,000 children miss school every day in the US because
of fear of being bullied (15% of those who do not show up to school every day);
one of every ten students drops out or changes school because of bullying; homicide
perpetrators were found to be twice as likely as homicide victims to have been bul-
lied previously by their peers; Bully victims are between 2 to 9 times more likely to
consider suicide than non-victims. In the UK, at least half of suicides among young
people are related to bullying. In South Korea, one school-aged kid (10 to 19) com-
mits suicide each day, and the suicide is the largest cause of death for people between
15 and 24 (there are 13 suicides per 100,000 people).3
Surprisingly, economic literature has remained aside from the research efforts that
try to understand better the bullying and cybercrime phenomena. This and the next
2 Anti-bullying campaigns and laws have been implemented in the US, Canada, UK, Germany,
Scandinavia, Colombia and South Korea
3 Suicide is South Korea single highest in the world with 31.7 suicides per 100,000 people.
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Chapter of this dissertation intends to end this absence by assessing the determinants
and consequences of being bullied and being a bully. Chapters 1 and 2 of this dis-
sertation use South Korean data on teenagers. In this particular chapter, we assess
the extent to which cognitive and non-cognitive skills are able to deter the occurrence
of these unwanted behaviors, and also how they palliate or exacerbate the effects of
bullying on several outcomes of interest like depression, life satisfaction, the incidence
of smoking, drinking, some health indicators and the ability to cope with stressful
situations.4
We use a structural model that relies in the identification of latent skills to deal
with selection. Our model is flexible enough to incorporate several desirable fea-
tures. First, it recognizes that cognitive and non-cognitive measures observed by the
researcher are only approximations or functions of the true latent skills (Heckman
et al., 2006a). Second, the model uses mixture of normals in the estimation of the
distributions of the latent factors. This guarantees the flexibility required to appro-
priately recreate the unobserved distributions in the estimation. Therefore, we do not
assume any functional form for the distributions of the factors; instead, we estimate
these distributions directly and often find that they are far from normal. Third, the
model does not assume linearity in the estimation. In fact, simulations show that
the estimated effects of skills on the outcomes evaluated are very non-linear. Finally,
the structural model allows the researcher to simulate counterfactuals for each skill
level, which are used to calculate treatment effect parameters of bullying on several
4 Cognitive skills are defined as “all forms of knowing and awareness such as perceiving, conceiving,
remembering, reasoning, judging, imagining, and problem solving” (APA, 2006), and non-cognitive
skills are defined as personality and motivational traits that determine the way individuals think,
feel and behave (Borghans et al., 2008). Literature has shown that cognitive and non-cognitive skills
are critical to the development of successful lives (see for example Murnane et al., 1995; Cawley




This chapter contributes to the literature in several ways. First, to the best of our
knowledge, this is the first attempt to assess the determinants and consequences of
bullying while dealing with the problems caused by selection into becoming a victim
or a perpetrator of bullying, providing insights that can potentially motivate inter-
ventions to reduce their incidence. Second, we provide evidence on how cognitive and
non-cognitive affect the likelihood of being bullied, being a bully, or being a cyber-
bully, and also how these endowments deter or exacerbate the consequences of these
behaviors in subsequent years. The context is special, given that the population ana-
lyzed is followed during their transition from high school to an adult life. Therefore,
we see the effects victimization and skills on different outcomes during very decisive
times in these young lives. Third, we are able to quantify the effect of being a bully
and being bullied on several outcomes controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity
caused by the latent skills.
1.2 Related Literature
Economic research on bullying is very scarce. This is the case manly because of
two reasons. First and foremost, the lack of longitudinal data that inquire about
bullying; and second, the fact that selection into bullying is not random. Therefore,
the consequences of being bullied can be confounded by the intrinsic characteristics
that made the person a victim or a perpetrator in the first place. While some economic
papers have been able to use long longitudinal data, they have not been able to deal
with the selection issue. To the best of our knowledge there are two papers in the
economic literature that address bullying in particular. Brown and Taylor (2008) use
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OLS regressions and ordered probits to look at educational attainment and wages
in the UK. They find that being bullied and being a bully is correlated with lower
educational attainment and in consequence with lower wages later in life. The second
study is that of Eriksen et al. (2012) that uses detailed Danish data, in which they use
OLS and FE regressions to find correlations between bullying and grades, pregnancy,
use of psychopharmachological medication, height and weight. Although these are
novel efforts, none of them deal properly with the non-randomness of the bullying
“treatment”.5
Bullying is a conduct disorder. Therefore, our work on bullies relates with that
of Le et al. (2005), in which they evaluate the impacts of conduct disorders during
childhood. The authors bundle bullying with several other conduct disorders like
stealing, fighting, raping, damaging someone’s property on purpose and conning,
among others. They use an Australian sample of twins to account for the self-selection
that arise from genetic and environmental reasons. Using OLS regressions, they find
that kids that conduct disorders were positively correlated with dropping-out from
school and unemployed later in life. As in the papers of Brown and Taylor (2008) and
Eriksen et al. (2012), Le et al. (2005) are unable to deal with the endogeneity that can
arise from the fact that the intrinsic unobservable characteristics that influence the
conduct disorder might also be influencing the realization of the outcome variables
they assess.
Psychology and sociology literatures have been more prolific in terms of descrip-
tions of bullying as a social phenomenon. For instance, findings from (Smith et al.,
2004) show that bullying victims have fewer friends, are more likely to be absent from
5 Eriksen et al. (2012) argue that the family fixed-effects help address the selection on unobserv-
ables issue. However, in Chapter 2, I present evidence that shows that birth order influences the
likelihood of being victimized at age 15.
5
school, and do not like break times. This literature has also found that younger kids
are more likely to be bullied and that this phenomenon is more frequent among boys
than among girls (Boulton and Underwood, 1993; Perry et al., 1988). Interestingly,
Olweus (1997) found that school and class size are not significant determinants of the
likelihood of bullying occurrence. Furthermore, Ouellet-Morin et al. (2011) showed
that victims’ brains have unhealthy cortisol reactions that make it difficult to cope
with stressful situations.
The characterizations of the victims and perpetrators highlight the importance of
controlling for non-cognitive skills throughout our analysis. According to psychologi-
cal research bullied children have in general less self-esteem, and have a negative view
of their situation (Björkqvist et al., 1982; Olweus, 1997). Bullies have been found to
lack self-control and exceed in aggressiveness towards peers and adults (Björkqvist
et al., 1982). All these analyses, although descriptive, provide a critical input in the
definition of the models we use in our own work.
1.3 Data
We use the Junior High School Panel (JHSP) of the Korean Youth Panel Survey
(KYP). The KYP-JHSP is a longitudinal survey that started in 2003 sampling a
group of second year junior high-school students (i.e., 14 year olds). The youngsters
were interviewed once a year until 2008. Thus, they were followed though high-school
and into the beginning of their adult life. In particular, we are able to observe higher
education choices fro those that go to college and early employment choices for those
not enrolling in college.
As this is a sensitive age range regarding life-path choices, the KYP-JHSP pro-
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vides interesting opportunity to understand the effects of non-cognitive skills on later
decisions and behavior. The KYP-JHSP pays special interest in the life-path choices
made by the surveyed population, inquiring not only about their decisions, but also
about the environment surrounding their choices. Youths are often asked about their
motives and the reasons that drive their decision-making process. Future goals and
parental involvement in such choices are frequently elicited. The KYP-JHSP is also
suitable to track non-cognitive skill dynamics given that the kids are interviewed for
the first time during the beginning of their teen period. This allows the researcher to
observe the evolution of skills during this critical age, and to see how the quality of
the teenager’s environment affects the likelihood of making good choices and avoiding
risky and harmful behavior.
The sample consists of 12 regions including Seoul Metropolitan City. Children
were sampled according to the proportion of the second year junior high-school stu-
dents present in each region. The panel consists of 3,449 youths and their parents or
guardians (see descriptive statistics in Table 1.1). Subjects were consistently inter-
viewed in six waves.6 Each year, information was collected in two separate question-
naires: one for the teenager, and another one for the parents or guardians.
6 As in any longitudinal survey, attrition can an issue. By wave 2, 92% of the sample remained;
by wave 3, 91% did so; by wave 4, 90%; and by wave 5, 86% remained in the sample. Appendix J
presents an analysis on the attrited observations. In particular, being a bully or being a victim of
bullies is not a determinant for leaving the sample.
7
Tab. 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
Total sample size 3,449
Number of Females 1,724 Fathers Education:
Proportion of urban households 78.55% High-school 42.94%
Prop. of single-headed households 6% 4yr Coll. or above 36.56%
Median monthly income per-capita 1mill won Mothers Education:
Prop. of Youths in College by 19 56.65% High-school 56.31%
Incidence of smoking by 19⇤ 19.08% 4yr Coll. or above 19.51%
Prop. of Single-child households 8.6%
⇤Incidence calculated as the proportion of people who has smoked at least once in the last year
Besides inquiring about career planning and choices, the KYP-JHSP inquires
about academic performance, student effort and participation in different kinds of
private tutoring. The survey also asks about time allocation, leisure activities, so-
cial relations, attachment to friends and family, participation in deviant activity, and
the number of times the respondent has been victimized in different settings. In
addition, the survey performs a comprehensive battery of personality questions from
which measures of self-esteem, self-stigmatization, self-reliance, aggressiveness, anger,
self control and satisfaction with life can be constructed.
While the youngsters are often asked about the involvement of their parents in
many aspects of their life, parents and guardians answer only a short questionnaire
covering household composition and their education, occupation and income.
1.3.1 The Construction of the Non-Cognitive Measures
As mentioned below in the description of our empirical strategy, our estimation of
the distribution parameters of the latent non-cognitive trait uses three scores that
measure socio-emotional skills. The KYP-JHSP contains a comprehensive battery of
measures related to socio-emotional skills. Among them, we chose the measures of
locus of control, irresponsibility and self-esteem to use in our initial estimation of the
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distribution of non-cognitive skills.
It should be noted that most of the socio-emotional information in the KYP-
JHSP is recorded in categories that group the reactions of the respondent in bins
like “strongly agree” or “disagree”. In consequence, and following common practice
in the literature, we constructed socio-emotional skill measures by adding categorical
answers of several questions regarding the same topic. This method incorporates some
degree of continuity in the scores, which is essential for our estimation procedure.
The questions used can be found in Appendix I, and Table 1.2 show the descriptive
statistics of the constructed measures.
Tab. 1.2: Descriptive Statistics of Non-Cognitive Measures
Locus of Control Irresponsibility Self-esteem
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
All 10.679 2.142 8.288 2.403 -4.051 4.455
Males 10.835 2.182 8.310 2.397 -3.848 4.445
Females 10.524 2.091 8.267 2.409 -4.252 4.455
Attending College⇤ 11.114 1.949 8.004 2.266 -2.913 4.103
Not Attending College⇤ 11.166 2.007 8.124 2.347 -3.142 4.537
⇤ Sample limited to wave 6
1.3.2 The Construction of the Cognitive Measures
Although the KYP-JHSP has a rich battery of behavioral questions, unfortunately it
is quite limited regarding cognitive measures. Ideally, we would like to have measures
closely linked to cognitive ability that are expected to be orthogonal to non-cognitive
measures, such as coding speed and digit recollection. However, the lack of such
measures forces us to infer cognitive ability from grades and academic performance.
In particular, we use the scores obtained in tests of i) math and science; ii) language
(Korean) and social studies; and iii) the grade obtained in an overall test taken yearly.
See Table 1.3 for the descriptive statistics of these measures.
9
Tab. 1.3: Descriptive Statistics of Cognitive Measures (Standardized)
Math and Science Language and Class grade
Social Studies in last semester
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
All 0.115 1.043 -0.002 1.066 -0.137 1.074
Males 0.255 1.044 -0.141 1.081 -0.192 1.067
Females -0.024 1.024 0.008 1.050 -0.081 1.079
Attending College⇤ 0.236 1.007 0.101 1.011 0.027 1.015
Not Attending College⇤ -0.043 1.068 -0.138 1.119 -0.351 1.110
⇤ Sample limited to wave 6
Previous literature has shown that academic performance is not orthogonal to
socio-emotional skills. In other words, the production function of academic test scores
has to be modeled using both cognitive and socio-emotional skills as inputs. As will
be shown in Section 1.5, our model takes fully into account this feature of the data
and incorporates it into the estimation.
1.4 Reduced Form Regressions and the Issue of Selection
We would like to inquire about the effect of bulling D at time t on outcomes of interest
Y measured at time t + h. The outcomes we consider are depression, the likelihood
of smoking, drinking, life satisfaction, self reported physical and mental health, and
indexes of stress on treatment variables like being bullied or being a bully.7 Therefore
the model to estimate as in Brown and Taylor (2008) and Eriksen et al. (2012) is one
of the form
Yt+h = XY   +  Dt + et+h
7 Self reported physical health is measured as whether the respondent considers she is in good
health or not. The mental health outcome is measured as whether the respondent has been diagnosed
to have psychological or mental problems. Regarding the stress measures, we use two outcome
measures. First, we use an index that quantifies how stressed the respondent gets regarding self
image. Second, we use and index that results from the summation of the stress indexes related to
stress caused by parents, friends, image and poverty. Descriptive statistics of the outcome variables
can be found in Table G.1 and G.2.
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where XY is a matrix with all observable controls. However, D 6? e, and therefore,
 ̂ will be biased. If we consider that ability or skill endowments play a role in this
endogeneity, we would like to introduce measures T of these endowments (i.e., test
scores) as controls. In order to deter reverse causality, we would like these measures
to be taken before the bullying episode occurs, that is at time t   1. The regression
equation becomes:
Yt+h = XY   +  Dt + ⇡Tt 1 + ⌫t+h (1.1)
Tables 1.4 to 1.8 show the results of regressions of the form of (1.1). The re-
duced form regressions indicate that there are correlations between being bullied at
15 and depression, the likelihood of being sick, having mental health issues and feeling
stressed at 18. In the same way, they show that being a bully at age 15 is correlated
with being depressed, smoking and feeling stressed by 18. We see no correlations
between being bullied or being a bully with drinking, life satisfaction or going to
college. Tables 1.4 to 1.8 also show a interesting characteristic of these reduced form
regressions: out of the the six proxies of abilities we use (i.e., locus of control, irre-
sponsibility, self-esteem, math score, language score, class score) no more than three
of them turn out to correlate with the outcome variables given the other controls in
every regression.
We are not able to claim causality with these regressions because we have the
strong conviction that even after controlling for test scores D is still endogenous.
In addition, the components of T are only proxies of ability. Therefore, as we will
confirm below, T introduces a measurement error that correlates with ⌫t+h in (1.1).
Furthermore, D and T are also correlated. Hence, regressions like (1.1) are problem-
atic due to the fact that the selection and endogeneity problems are not solved by
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the introduction of more controls. The obvious alternatives to these issue are the use
of instrumental variables and structural modeling. We choose to do the latter as we
lack of any exogenous variation that we could exploit as an instrument.
Tab. 1.4: Reduced Form Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Depression Drinking
Bullied 0.430 0.330 0.006 0.003
(0.282) (0.286) (0.031) (0.031)
Bully 0.735** 0.673** 0.029 0.026
(0.325) (0.329) (0.036) (0.036)
Age in Months -0.019 -0.028 -0.016 -0.005* -0.004 -0.005
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Male -0.951*** -0.937*** -0.963*** 0.133*** 0.131*** 0.133***
(0.187) (0.183) (0.187) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
Oldersiblings -0.239 -0.237 -0.227 0.019 0.027 0.019
(0.177) (0.173) (0.177) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020)
Youngsiblings -0.133 -0.103 -0.122 -0.006 -0.003 -0.005
(0.178) (0.175) (0.178) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020)
Lnmonthinc_pc -0.294 -0.251 -0.293 0.003 -0.001 0.003
(0.187) (0.184) (0.187) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
Urban -0.254 -0.303 -0.240 -0.046 -0.050* -0.045
(0.271) (0.264) (0.270) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030)
LivesBothParents -0.826* -0.827* -0.828* -0.042 -0.051 -0.042
(0.465) (0.451) (0.465) (0.051) (0.049) (0.051)
OnlyMother -1.002 -0.928 -0.974 0.003 -0.003 0.004
(0.614) (0.600) (0.614) (0.068) (0.066) (0.068)
FatherEd2yColl 0.083 0.002 0.078 -0.023 -0.023 -0.023
(0.349) (0.343) (0.349) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039)
FatherEd4yColl 0.092 0.057 0.092 -0.051** -0.051** -0.051**
(0.218) (0.215) (0.218) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
FathereducGS 0.370 0.314 0.373 -0.011 -0.015 -0.011
(0.398) (0.388) (0.398) (0.044) (0.042) (0.044)
Locus of Control -0.097 -0.087 -0.104 0.010 0.008 0.010
(0.098) (0.095) (0.098) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Irresponsibility 0.480*** 0.447*** 0.459*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.043***
(0.096) (0.095) (0.097) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Self-Esteem -0.981*** -0.994*** -0.983*** -0.035*** -0.031*** -0.035***
(0.096) (0.094) (0.096) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Math - Science -0.179 -0.146 -0.169 -0.003 0.001 -0.003
(0.127) (0.125) (0.127) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Language - SSt. 0.054 0.022 0.045 0.015 0.013 0.015
(0.131) (0.129) (0.131) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Class Score 0.270* 0.271** 0.267* -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.044***
(0.141) (0.138) (0.141) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
Observations 2,538 2,636 2,538 2,544 2,642 2,544
R-squared 0.091 0.091 0.093 0.050 0.051 0.051
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Intercepts of regressions
not shown.
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Tab. 1.5: Reduced Form Regressions
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES Smoking Life Satisfaction
Bullied 0.010 -0.006 -0.038 -0.043
(0.022) (0.022) (0.031) (0.031)
Bully 0.109*** 0.113*** 0.030 0.035
(0.025) (0.025) (0.035) (0.036)
Age in Months -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.003 0.005* 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Male 0.128*** 0.127*** 0.126*** 0.035* 0.031 0.035*
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Oldersiblings -0.014 -0.011 -0.012 0.043** 0.044** 0.044**
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Youngsiblings -0.021 -0.017 -0.019 0.013 0.017 0.014
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Lnmonthinc_pc -0.005 -0.007 -0.005 0.073*** 0.069*** 0.074***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Urban -0.003 -0.019 -0.001 -0.061** -0.055* -0.061**
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
LivesBothParents -0.071** -0.079** -0.072** 0.068 0.066 0.067
(0.036) (0.034) (0.035) (0.051) (0.049) (0.051)
OnlyMother -0.050 -0.048 -0.046 0.069 0.068 0.071
(0.047) (0.046) (0.047) (0.067) (0.065) (0.067)
FatherEd2yColl 0.014 0.020 0.013 0.085** 0.088** 0.084**
(0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038)
FatherEd4yColl -0.005 -0.009 -0.005 -0.003 0.002 -0.003
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
FathereducGS 0.007 0.011 0.008 0.095** 0.111*** 0.095**
(0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043)
Locus of Control 0.017** 0.012 0.016** 0.027** 0.024** 0.026**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Irresponsibility 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.036*** -0.011 -0.012 -0.012
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Self-Esteem -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 0.074*** 0.076*** 0.074***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Math - Science -0.009 -0.004 -0.008 0.004 0.003 0.004
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Language - SSt. -0.008 -0.010 -0.009 0.009 0.012 0.008
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Class Score -0.040*** -0.041*** -0.041*** 0.030** 0.028* 0.030*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Observations 2,544 2,642 2,544 2,544 2,642 2,544
R-squared 0.086 0.096 0.094 0.069 0.069 0.069
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Intercepts of regressions
not shown.
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Tab. 1.6: Reduced Form Regressions
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
VARIABLES Sick Psychological Problems
Bullied 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.039*** 0.036***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013)
Bully 0.019 0.011 0.024* 0.018
(0.019) (0.019) (0.014) (0.015)
Age in Months 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Male -0.023** -0.020* -0.023** 0.011 0.012 0.011
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Oldersiblings -0.018* -0.020** -0.017* 0.006 0.006 0.007
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Youngsiblings -0.010 -0.012 -0.010 0.003 0.003 0.004
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Lnmonthinc_pc -0.018* -0.016 -0.018* -0.004 -0.003 -0.004
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Urban -0.011 -0.014 -0.010 -0.013 -0.016 -0.013
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
LivesBothParents 0.020 0.024 0.020 0.016 0.008 0.016
(0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
OnlyMother 0.026 0.028 0.027 0.039 0.030 0.039
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
FatherEd2yColl -0.017 -0.020 -0.017 -0.010 -0.011 -0.010
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
FatherEd4yColl 0.018 0.015 0.018 0.006 0.005 0.006
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
FathereducGS 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.018 0.024 0.018
(0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
Locus of Control -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.008* -0.007 -0.008*
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Irresponsibility 0.011* 0.009 0.010* 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Self-Esteem -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.010** -0.011*** -0.010**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Math - Science 0.007 0.003 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.009
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Language - SSt. 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Class Score -0.017** -0.016** -0.017** -0.002 -0.005 -0.002
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 2,544 2,642 2,544 2,544 2,642 2,544
R-squared 0.019 0.014 0.019 0.020 0.016 0.021
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Intercepts of regressions
not shown.
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Tab. 1.7: Reduced Form Regressions
(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
VARIABLES Stress: Image StressTotal
Bullied 0.664*** 0.555** 2.469*** 2.001***
(0.213) (0.216) (0.668) (0.676)
Bully 0.851*** 0.739*** 3.520*** 3.168***
(0.246) (0.249) (0.771) (0.778)
Age in Months 0.013 0.014 0.016 0.048 0.043 0.061
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.060) (0.059) (0.060)
Male -0.958*** -0.936*** -0.971*** -1.226*** -1.066** -1.281***
(0.141) (0.139) (0.141) (0.442) (0.434) (0.441)
Oldersiblings -0.203 -0.188 -0.191 -0.145 -0.154 -0.091
(0.134) (0.131) (0.134) (0.420) (0.410) (0.419)
Youngsiblings -0.273** -0.250* -0.262* -0.005 0.017 0.043
(0.135) (0.132) (0.134) (0.421) (0.415) (0.420)
Lnmonthinc_pc -0.370*** -0.362*** -0.368*** -0.678 -0.601 -0.670
(0.142) (0.140) (0.141) (0.444) (0.437) (0.443)
Urban 0.110 0.146 0.125 0.609 0.761 0.673
(0.205) (0.200) (0.204) (0.641) (0.626) (0.639)
LivesBothParents -0.699** -0.770** -0.701** -1.244 -1.546 -1.251
(0.352) (0.341) (0.351) (1.102) (1.069) (1.098)
OnlyMother -1.348*** -1.239*** -1.317*** -3.056** -2.897** -2.923**
(0.464) (0.454) (0.464) (1.455) (1.423) (1.450)
FatherEd2yColl 0.444* 0.429* 0.438* 0.588 0.606 0.563
(0.264) (0.259) (0.264) (0.828) (0.813) (0.826)
FatherEd4yColl -0.224 -0.254 -0.224 -0.020 -0.181 -0.022
(0.165) (0.163) (0.165) (0.517) (0.509) (0.515)
FathereducGS -0.961*** -0.894*** -0.958*** -1.710* -1.641* -1.697*
(0.301) (0.294) (0.300) (0.943) (0.920) (0.940)
Locus of Control -0.105 -0.079 -0.112 -0.423* -0.416* -0.453**
(0.074) (0.072) (0.074) (0.231) (0.225) (0.231)
Irresponsibility 0.220*** 0.205*** 0.197*** 0.614*** 0.575** 0.515**
(0.073) (0.072) (0.073) (0.228) (0.226) (0.229)
Self-Esteem -0.656*** -0.653*** -0.659*** -1.991*** -2.020*** -2.000***
(0.073) (0.071) (0.072) (0.227) (0.222) (0.227)
Math - Science 0.011 0.033 0.023 0.323 0.436 0.371
(0.096) (0.094) (0.096) (0.300) (0.296) (0.300)
Language - SSt. -0.117 -0.151 -0.127 0.243 0.139 0.200
(0.099) (0.098) (0.099) (0.312) (0.307) (0.311)
Class Score 0.285*** 0.281*** 0.281*** 1.633*** 1.603*** 1.617***
(0.107) (0.105) (0.107) (0.335) (0.328) (0.334)
Observations 2,538 2,636 2,538 2,538 2,636 2,538
R-squared 0.094 0.091 0.097 0.075 0.076 0.081
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Intercepts of regressions
not shown.
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Tab. 1.8: Reduced For Regressions: Going to College
(1) (2) (3)





Age in Months 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Male -0.127*** -0.130*** -0.127***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020)
Oldersiblings -0.024 -0.025 -0.024
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Youngsiblings -0.010 -0.009 -0.010
(0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
Lnmonthinc_pc 0.010 0.013 0.010
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Urban -0.039 -0.040 -0.039
(0.029) (0.028) (0.029)
LivesBothParents 0.202*** 0.195*** 0.202***
(0.048) (0.047) (0.048)
OnlyMother 0.048 0.040 0.047
(0.064) (0.063) (0.064)
FatherEd2yColl 0.054 0.060 0.054
(0.038) (0.037) (0.038)
FatherEd4yColl -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(0.023) (0.022) (0.023)
FathereducGS -0.070* -0.063 -0.070*
(0.041) (0.040) (0.041)
Locus of Control -0.003 -0.005 -0.003
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Irresponsibility -0.006 -0.007 -0.006
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Self-Esteem -0.018* -0.020** -0.018*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Math - Science 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
Language - SSt. -0.030** -0.030** -0.030**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Class Score 0.049*** 0.051*** 0.049***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Constant 0.568*** 0.562*** 0.569***
(0.108) (0.106) (0.108)
Observations 2,274 2,359 2,274
R-squared 0.061 0.062 0.061
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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1.5 Empirical Strategy
The key feature of our empirical strategy is the way we deal with the fact that
underlying cognitive and non-cognitive skills are latent rather than observable, and
are in turn relevant determinants of outcomes, choices and scores. The core of the
empirical strategy is the assumption of a linear production function of test scores,
whose inputs include both the individual observable characteristics and the latent
skill endowments.8 The insight provided by Kotlarski (1967) allows us to use observed
test scores to identify the underlying distributions from which all the realizations of
latent endowments are drawn, facilitating the estimation of the complete structural
model. This is the case because such distributions allow us to integrate over the
unobservable skill endowments in all the outcomes, choices and scores associated
with the model, while still being able to retrieve the loadings associated with the
skills in every equation.
The crucial step of estimating the parameters that completely describe the distri-
butions of the underlying factors relies on a maximum likelihood estimation (MLE)
in which we use the mixture of normals in order to achieve the flexibility required
to mimic the true underlying distributions of the latent skill endowments. The mix-
ture of normals not only grants us flexibility in the type of distribution we are able to
replicate, but also allows us to integrate numerically using the Gauss-Hermite quadra-
ture, which is particularly useful for calculating E [f (X)] when X ⇠ N (µ,  2) (Judd,
8 In fact, variance decompositions of the test scores presented in Figure H.1 in the Appendix
show that latent endowments explain between 5 to 10 time more the variation of the scores than
the observable characteristics. However, these figures also show that even after controlling for latent
endowments more that half of the variation of the scores is still unexplained. These findings go
in line with our argument against the use test scores as proxies of abilities in Section 1.4. The
unexplained part of the variance of test scores will correlate with ⌫t+h in (1.1) biasing the results of
the regressions. That is why we will rather identify the latent endowments from the test scores.
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1998).9
1.5.1 The General Setup
The structural models we implement can be described as a set of measurement systems
that are linked by a factor structure. In a general setup, suppose we face the following
system for each individual in the sample:
Y = XY  
Y + ↵Y,A✓A + ↵Y,B✓B + eY (1.2)
where Y is a M ⇥ 1 vector of outcome variables, XY is a matrix with all observable
controls for each outcome variable, ↵Y,A and ↵Y,B are vectors that contain the factor
loadings for each one of the two factors (i.e., ✓A and ✓B), and eY is a vector of





, and also that eyi ? eyj for i, j = 1, . . . ,M . Furthermore, we
assume the factors ✓A and ✓B follow the distributions f✓A (·) and f✓B (·), respectively.
As indicated by Carneiro et al. (2003), the estimations that come from the factor
structure will gain interpretability and their identification will require less restrictions
if a measurement system is joined to the system described in (1.2). The purpose of
this adjoined system is to identify the distributional parameters of the unobserved
factors. This adjoined measurement system has the following form:
T = XT 
T + ↵T,A✓A + ↵T,B✓B + eT (1.3)
where T is a L ⇥ 1 vector of measurements (e.g., test scores), XT is a matrix with
9 The structural estimations presented in this Chapter were done using the heterofactor com-
mand for Stata developed by Miguel Sarzosa and Sergio Urzua. See Sarzosa and Urzua (2012).
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all observable controls for each measurement, and ↵T,A and ↵T,B, are the loadings




? eT, that all
the elements of the L ⇥ 1 vector eT are mutually independent and have associated
distributions feh (·) for every h = 1, . . . , L. Carneiro et al. (2003) show that, in order
to identify the loadings and the diagonal matrix of the variances of the factors ⌃✓,
we need to use two restrictions. First, we need ✓A ? ✓B. And second, if we let k be
the number of factors we are using in the model, we need L to be at least 2k + 1.
Therefore, the presence of two factors in (1.2) implies that there should be at least
five measures in (1.3).
From the insight provided by Kotlarski (1967), we know model (1.3), and in
particular the distributional parameters that describe f✓A (·) and f✓B (·), are non-
parametrically identified (up to one normalization). Therefore, one of the loadings of
each factor should be set equal to 1, and the estimation of all the rest of the loadings
should be interpreted as relative to those used as nummeraire. We estimate the model









XT1 , T1, ⇣
A, ⇣B
 
⇥ . . .
· · ·⇥ feL
 












where we integrate over the distributions of the factors due to their unobservable
nature, obtaining  ̂T ,↵T,A,↵T,B, F̂✓A (·) and F̂✓B (·). Note that we do not assume
any functional form for the distributions of the factors F✓A (·) and F✓B (·). On the
contrary, we estimate them.
Having identified the distributional parameters of F✓A (·) and F✓B (·) from (1.3),
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This MLE will yield  ̂Y ,↵Y,A and ↵Y,B.
Note that the two steps presented above can be joined and calculated in one
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1.5.2 Basic Model with a Choice Variable (Roy Model)
The general setup presented above in subsection (1.5.1) can be used to introduce a
special case in which there is a binary treatment D (e.g., being bullied or not) and
a subsequent outcome (e.g., likelihood of depression at age 19), that is, a model of
potential outcomes inspired by the Roy model (Roy, 1951; Willis and Rosen, 1979).
Individuals must choose between two sectors, for example, treated and not treated.




YD + ↵YD,A✓A + ↵YD,B✓B + eD > 0
⇤
where [A] denotes an indicator function that takes a value of 1 if A is true, XD rep-
resents a set of exogenous observables, and ✓A and ✓B represent the two factors drawn
from the distributions f✓A (·) and f✓B (·). Let Y0, Y1 denote an outcome of interest
20
(e.g., the likelihood of depression) for those with D = 0 and D = 1 respectively (e.g.,
non victims and bullying victims). Then, the system of equations (1.2) will represent







XY  Y1 + ↵Y1,A✓A + ↵Y1,B✓B + eY1 if D = 1






XY  Y0 + ↵Y0,A✓A + ↵Y0,B✓B + eY0 if D = 0





YD + ↵YD,A✓A + ↵YD,B✓B + eD > 0
⇤
(1.7)
where XY are a set of observable variables.
Now, let TNC1 , TNC2 , TNC3 , TC1 , TC2 and TC3 denote the scores of the different tests
related to non-cognitive and cognitive ability of the adjoined measurement system
(1.3). Then, our full system of equations is the following:
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Y1 = XY  
Y1 + ↵Y1,NC✓NC + ↵Y1,C✓C + eY1 (1.8)
Y0 = XY  
Y0 + ↵Y0,NC✓NC + ↵Y0,C✓C + eY0 (1.9)
D = XD 






















4 ✓NC + ↵T
C






5 ✓NC + ↵T
C






6 ✓NC + ↵T
C
6 ✓C + eT
C
3 (1.16)
We assume the error terms (eY1 , eY0 , eD, eTNC1 , eTNC2 , eTNC3 , eTC1 , eTC2 , eTC3 ) are inde-
pendent among themselves and from (✓C , ✓NC , XY , XD, XT ) and follow distributions
fY0 (·), fY1 (·), fD (·), fTNC1 (·), fTNC2 (·), fTNC3 (·), fTC1 (·), fTC2 (·), fTC3 (·) respectively.
The production functions for test scores presented in equations (1.11) to (1.16) incor-
porate the fact that the KYP-JHSP provides direct measures of “pure” non-cognitive
skills, providing only indirect measures of cognitive ability, in the form of academic
test scores, which likely reflect both cognitive and non-cognitive skills. This is why
cognitive skill is excluded from equations (1.11) to (1.13), while non-cognitive skill is
not excluded from (1.14) to (1.16).
We estimate the model using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). The likeli-
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In order to identify this model, in particular the parameters that describe the dis-
tributions of the latent factors, we need to do two normalizations. First, by setting
↵T
NC
3 = 1 we are able to identify the remaining loadings associated with the non-
cognitive skill. Having identified these loadings, we need to set ↵TC3 = 1 in order to
identify the remaining loadings associated with the cognitive skill.
1.5.3 The Case Where There is no Choice Equation
It is important to note that the system described in equations (1.2) and (1.3) and
estimated using equation (1.4) can easily be modified to incorporate outcomes that
are not observed only conditional on a choice such as D. Then, the outcomes vector
is Y = Y . In this case, the system becomes
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Y = XY  
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3 ✓C + eT
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3 (1.22)
























































1.6 Results from the Model
1.6.1 Estimation Results
1.6.1.1 The Estimation of Non-Cognitive and Cognitive Endowments
Tables 1.9 and 1.10 show the results of our estimation of a measurement system like
(1.3). In particular, we estimate equations (1.19) to (1.22) with which we identify
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the parameters governing the distribution function of the latent non-cognitive and
cognitive factors f✓NC (·) and f✓C (·) as of the initial sample period (t = 1). We include
a set of controls XT representing the context surrounding the youths development. We
include a gender dummy, family structure indicators, father’s education attainment,
monthly income per capita and the age stated in months starting from March 1989
(because all sample individuals were born within the same academic year, which goes
from March to February).
Tab. 1.9: Identification of Non-cognitive Skills at t = 1
Locus of Control Irresponsibility Self-esteem
VARIABLES Coeff. Std. Err Coeff. Std. Err Coeff. Std. Err
Month of Birth -0.014*** (0.005) 0.020*** (0.005) -0.018*** (0.005)
male 0.134*** (0.037) -0.025 (0.038) 0.152*** (0.036)
oldersiblings 0.024 (0.035) -0.016 (0.035) -0.006 (0.034)
youngsiblings 0.026 (0.035) -0.088** (0.036) 0.032 (0.034)
lnmonthinc_pc 0.100*** (0.034) -0.120*** (0.035) 0.039 (0.033)
urban 0.171*** (0.056) -0.057 (0.056) 0.020 (0.054)
livesbothprnts 0.174* (0.106) -0.327*** (0.108) 0.231** (0.103)
onlymother 0.261* (0.143) -0.224 (0.145) 0.358** (0.140)
fathered2yColl 0.148** (0.074) -0.174** (0.075) -0.012 (0.071)
fathered4yColl 0.209*** (0.044) -0.200*** (0.045) 0.118*** (0.043)
fathereducGS 0.315*** (0.078) -0.378*** (0.079) 0.167** (0.077)
Factor Loading 0.747*** (0.112) -0.599*** (0.086) 1 ·
Constant -0.958*** (0.181) 0.886*** (0.184) -0.630*** (0.177)
Observations 3,109 3,109 3,109
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Tab. 1.10: Identification of Cognitive Skills at t = 1
Math and Science Language & Soc. St. Class Grade
VARIABLES Coeff. Std. Err Coeff. Std. Err Coeff. Std. Err
Month of Birth -0.011** (0.004) -0.011** (0.004) -0.017*** (0.004)
male 0.286*** (0.033) -0.018 (0.032) 0.087*** (0.029)
oldersiblings 0.029 (0.030) -0.045 (0.030) -0.017 (0.027)
youngsiblings 0.078** (0.031) 0.073** (0.031) 0.107*** (0.028)
lnmonthinc_pc 0.164*** (0.030) 0.170*** (0.030) 0.160 *** (0.028)
urban 0.050 (0.050) 0.097** (0.049) -0.026 (0.043)
livesbothprnts 0.528*** (0.094) 0.469*** (0.093) 0.472*** (0.088)
onlymother 0.578*** (0.125) 0.494*** (0.123) 0.331*** (0.116)
fathered2yColl 0.233** (0.072) 0.151** (0.071) 0.236*** (0.069)
fathered4yColl 0.215*** (0.038) 0.359*** (0.037) 0.299*** (0.033)
fathereducGS 0.341*** (0.070) 0.533*** (0.068) 0.442*** (0.061)
No-Cog Load 0.126*** (0.007) 0.116*** (0.007) 0.101*** (0.006)
Cogn Load 0.658*** (0.018) 0.690*** (0.018) 1 ·
Constant -1.458*** (0.158) -1.314*** (0.156) -1.123*** (0.144)
Observations 3,109 3,109 3,109
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.9 present the results for the estimation of equations (1.19) to (1.20). It
indicates that, as expected, non-cognitive scores do depend strongly on our estimated




TNC2 are large and statistically different from zero at the 99% level of confidence. Our
estimations of  T1 ,  T2 and  T3 , the coefficients associated with the controls contain
some interesting findings. In congruence with Cunha et al. (2006) and Heckman
and Masterov (2007), kids that come from wealthier, more educated parents tend to
be more responsible, have higher self-control and are more positive about themselves.
Our results also suggest that family composition plays a big role in fostering desirable
personality traits. Kids with younger siblings and those who live with both their
parents tend to be more responsible. Interestingly, the kids who live with their mother
score substantially higher in the self-esteem scale than those who live only with their
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father. Another notable finding, which is in line with Borghans et al. (2008), is that
younger kids are less responsible and have less self-control and self-esteem, even within
the same year of age.
In an analogous way, Table 1.10 shows estimates of equations (1.21) to (1.22).
As explained above, we allow both the cognitive and non-cognitive latent skill en-
dowments to be inputs in the production function of our cognitive test scores. In











6 and ↵TC6 are highly significant in every cognitive mea-
sure used. As with the non-cognitive measures, the cognitive scores are for kids that
come from wealthier and more educated parents, especially if the mother is present in
the family. In addition, kids with younger siblings tend to score better in all cognitive
measures, while that is not the case for those who have older siblings.
Using the estimates of equations (1.19) to (1.22) we are able to recreate the esti-
mated distributions of initial non-cognitive and cognitive skills across the population
evaluated at t = 1. These distributions are presented in Figures 1.1a and 1.1b.
Fig. 1.1: Distributions at t = 1
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1.6.1.2 Bullying and Cyberbullying
We now analyze bullying in a context like the one described in subsection 1.5.3. In
this setup, we evaluate the determinants of being bullied, being a bully and being a
cyberbully at age 14 (i.e., t = 2).10 We are particularly interested in assessing the
relation between skills and these behaviors. Table 1.11 shows our results from the
estimation of a model described in equations (1.18) to (1.22). The most salient finding
is that while cognitive skills do no play a role in deterring or motivating any of these
undesired behaviors, non-cognitive skills are a very important determinant in the
likelihood of incurring in them. Our findings indicate that a one standard deviation
increase in non-cognitive skills translates into a 5.69 percentage points reduction in the
likelihood of being bullied. That is, an standard deviation increase in non-cognitive
skills reduces by half the overall probability of being a victim of bullying. In the same
vein, a standard deviation increase in non-cognitive skills reduces the likelihood of
being a bully by 1.92 percentage points. This corresponds to a 24.7% reduction in
the overall probability of being a bully. Finally, a standard deviation increase in non-
cognitive skills tallies with a reduction of 5.08 percentage points in the likelihood of
being a cyberbully, which corresponds to a 17.97% reduction in the overall probability
of being a cyberbully.
The sizes of the effects are remarkable and highlight the importance of fostering
non-cognitive skills to significantly reduce the incidence of bullying. Our results show
that non-cognitive skills deter bullying by acting on both sides of the problem: the
victims and the perpetrators. We will come back to extend this claim later in this
Chapter.
10 Recall that, as shown in the previous subsection, latent skills were measured one survey wave
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In addition to the findings regarding non-cognitive endowments, the results in
Table 1.11 contain other interesting findings. First, note that while age in months
is associated with a higher likelihood of being a bully, it is not associated with the
likelihood of being a cyberbully. This is particularly relevant because it indicates that
older kids are more likely to be bullies, but not cyberbullies.11 So, to the extent that
older kids are more likely to be taller and bigger, what this might be capturing is the
fact that, given the skills and other observable characteristics, physically bigger kids
are more likely to be bullies and not cyberbullies. Physical size is not an issue in this
case, as the attack is done through cyberspace. There is no physical confrontation
and therefore physical disparities are no longer a necessary condition for bullying to
happen.
Another finding related with the observable characteristics indicates that bullying
is more prevalent among boys than among girls.12 This goes in line with several
woks in the psychological literature (Olweus, 1997; Wolke et al., 2001; Smith et al.,
2004; Faris and Felmlee, 2011). Finally, we find that having a younger sibling deters
bullying. One tentative explanation is that having a younger member of the family
might give experience to the older sibling on how to deal in a positive way with people
who are weaker. Therefore, while possible bullies are discouraged to take advantage
of more fragile kids, possible victims might feel that they are stronger than someone,
which might prevent them from accepting abuse from bullies.
11 The coding of the Age in Months variable starts with a 1 for kids born in March 1989 and
end with a 12 for the kinds born in February 1990. Therefore, older kids have lower values in the
variable.
12 Notice that due to the way gender enters the model, we are capturing its level effects on the
likelihood of bullying. The analysis of gender-specific effects of skills on that likeihood is of great
importance and left for future research.
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1.6.1.3 The Estimation of a Model without Decision Equation
The reader should note that the adjoined measurement system described by equations
(1.11) to (1.16) is the same one described in equations (1.19) to (1.22). That is,
the identification process of the factor distributions is the same, and therefore, the
results presented in Tables 1.9 and 1.10 hold for the models with and without decision
equation.
Tables 1.12 and 1.13 show the estimations of equation (1.18). That is, without
the introduction of a treatment variable. It is presented as a benchmark the see
how the outcome variables are effected overall by the observable and unobservable
characteristics of the respondents. These results indicate that non-cognitive skills
measured at age 14 are negatively associated with the likelihood of depression, the
incidence of drinking and smoking, the likelihood of being sick, having mental health
issues, or feeling stressed in general at age 18. Furthermore, non-cognitive skills have
a positive effect three times larger on the likelihood of having a positive perception of
life than cognitive skills. This is linked with the fact that while non-cognitive skills
reduce the likelihood of depression, cognitive skills increase it. Just like happens
with the stress variables. However, the reduction on the likelihood of depression and
stress due to non-cognitive skills is much larger than the increase in the likelihood of
depression and stress caused by cognitive skills. We find no effect of cognitive skills on
the incidence of drinking alcohol or having mental health issues. Finally, our results
indicate that cognitive and non-cognitive skills have roughly the same effect on the






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1.6.1.4 The Estimation of a Model with Decision Equation (Roy Model)
We now turn to the estimation of the choice equation (1.10) and the outcome equa-
tions (1.9) and (1.8). Our treatments of interest are whether the youngster is bullied
or not, and whether he or she is a bully or not. It should be noted that in order to
facilitate identification and not rely only on functional form assumptions, we intro-
duced an additional control in the choice equation that measures school quality.13 As
outcomes, we use the same measures used in Section 1.4.
The results are presented in Tables 1.14, 1.15, 1.16 and 1.17. Our findings indi-
cate that skills have some differential effects on the outcomes of interest depending on
whether, the person was involved in bullying or not. These findings suggests some-
thing we will return to in Subsection 1.6.2.4: skills not only influence the likelihood
of being involved in bullying, but they also play a role in dealing with the negative
consequences after the bullying event has occurred. For instance, cognitive skills tend
to deter drinking and smoking more among victims of bullying and bullies themselves
than among non-victims and non-bullies. Also, cognitive skills boost life satisfaction
in a higher extent to victims than to non-victims. In the same way, non-cognitive skills
reduce the likelihood of feeling stressed due to personal image more among victims
than among non-victims. Non-cognitive skills increase life satisfaction among non-
bullies, while that is not the case among bullies. In the same vein, non-cognitive skills
are stronger preventers of mental health issues and stress among perpetrators than
13 Th school quality measure is an index that aggregates measures of teacher responsiveness, school
environment and learning conditions. The teacher responsiveness measure is based on the perceptions
students have of their teacher, such as whether they think they can talk to their teacher openly and
whether they would like to turn out to be like their teacher when they become adults. School
environment is measured using information about robbery and criminal activity within or around
the school and the presence of litter and garbage within the school or its surroundings. Finally,
the learning conditions measure is based on the likelihood of students attending top institutions of
higher education after graduating from that particular school, and whether students believe their
school allows them to develop their talents and abilities.
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among non-bullies. So regardless of whether bullying has large or small consequences
on a particular dimension—which is the topic of Section 1.6.2, skill endowments help
cope with these consequences in various ways depending on the outcome.
Although these findings are very informative, they do not say anything about the
causal effect of bullying on later outcomes, which is the ultimate goal of implementing
this model. We commit to this task in the next section.
1.6.2 Simulations
One advantage of the structural empirical strategy chosen is that we are able to
recreate outcome levels as a function of the latent factors, allowing us to see simul-
taneously the effect of both skills on the outcome of interest. Consequently, we are
able to simulate counterfactual individuals for each level of skills (Heckman et al.,
2006b). This allows us to calculate the average treatment effect (ATE), the treat-
ment effect on the treated (TT), and the treatment effect o the untreated (TUT)
of being bullied or being a bully conditional on each level of cognitive and non-
































  ✓NCi , ✓Ci , D = 0
⇤
.
1.6.2.1 Assessing the Fit of the Model
In order to be comfortable presenting the treatment effect results drawn from sim-
ulations, we need to show that our model is able to replicate the treatments and
outcomes contained in the data. Therefore, we use the results presented in Section
1.6.1 to simulate treatments and outcomes and compare them to the actual data to










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































lied and being a bully. Our model predicts almost perfectly the likelihood of being
treated. While the data shows that 11.07% of the sample declares being bullied, our
model predicts that 11.08% of the sample receives the “bullied treatment”. In the
same way, while the data shows that 7.77% of the sample reports being a bully, our
model predicts that 7.77% of the sample receives the “bully treatment”.
The next step is to assess the fit of the model in terms of the outcome variables.
That is, we will compare E [Y0 |D = 0] and E [Y1 |D = 1] between the data and our
model. Tables 1.18 and 1.19 show data-model comparisons of the outcome variables
for the bullied treatment and the bully treatment respectively. We see that our
model is able to recreate the data in a very precise way. This gives us confidence
about our capability of simulation counterfactuals: E [Y1 |D = 0] and E [Y0 |D = 1],
also presented in Tables 1.18 and 1.19.
Tab. 1.18: Assessing the Fit of the Model: Outcomes for Bullied
Depression Smoking Sick
Data Model Data Model Data Model
E [Y0 |D = 0] 15.5955 15.5595 .1252 .1396 .0636 .0605
E [Y1 |D = 1] 16.1523 16.1088 .1706 .1762 .1122 .1178
E [Y0 |D = 1] ⌅ 15.9442 ⌅ .1748 ⌅ .0659
E [Y1 |D = 0] ⌅ 15.9602 ⌅ .1624 ⌅ .1252
Mental Health StessImage StressTotal
Data Model Data Model Data Model
E [Y0 |D = 0] .0369 .0324 10.0757 10.0775 42.7570 42.96
E [Y1 |D = 1] .0825 .0854 10.7119 10.7525 46.4799 45.7157
E [Y0 |D = 1] ⌅ .0428 ⌅ 10.2525 ⌅ 43.6546
E [Y1 |D = 0] ⌅ .0756 ⌅ 10.4152 ⌅ 44.5614
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Tab. 1.19: Assessing the Fit of the Model: Outcomes for Bully
Depression Smoking Sick
Data Model Data Model Data Model
E [Y0 |D = 0] 15.5926 15.5601 .1185 .1311 .0685 .0731
E [Y1 |D = 1] 16.3727 16.4359 .2364 .2637 .0904 .0989
E [Y0 |D = 1] ⌅ 15.5032 ⌅ .141 ⌅ .0715
E [Y1 |D = 0] ⌅ 16.5786 ⌅ .2561 ⌅ .0966
Mental Health StessImage StressTotal
Data Model Data Model Data Model
E [Y0 |D = 0] .0389 .0398 10.0767 10.0819 42.9791 42.9704
E [Y1 |D = 1] .0724 .0734 10.8909 10.8445 46.2454 46.5123
E [Y0 |D = 1] ⌅ .0401 ⌅ 10.0036 ⌅ 42.8792
E [Y1 |D = 0] ⌅ .0098 ⌅ 10.967 ⌅ 46.6772
1.6.2.2 ATE, TT and TUT of Being Bullied
Once we have estimated the counterfactuals, we are able to calculate treatment-
effect parameters. Our first step is to calculate those tratment-effect parameters for
the case where the treatment is being a victim of bullying. Table 1.20 shows there
are significant effects of victimization on depression, sickness, mental health issues
and stress. Our results indicate that being bullied at age 15 increases the chances
of suffering from depression at age 18 by a tenth of a standard deviation. Being
bullied also increases the chances of reporting to have health issues. In fact, bullying
victimization causes the incidence of sickness almost to double. In the same way, the
incidence of mental health issues is also doubled due to victimization. Regarding the
stress measures, we find that being bullied increases the incidence of stress due to
self-image by a standard deviation.
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Tab. 1.20: ATE, TT and TUT of Being Bullied
Depre Smoking Sickness Mental StressImage StressTotal
ATE 0.3962*** 0.0239 0.0669** 0.0421* 0.3390*** 1.6620***
(0.032479) (0.0272) (0.0271) (0.0251) (0.0308) (0.0507)
TT 0.2274** 0.0151 0.0536 0.0437 0.3443*** 1.7744***
(0.1024) (0.0827) (0.0825) (0.0826) (0.0934) (0.1547)
TUT 0.4197*** 0.0252 .0685** 0.0420 0.3417*** 1.6603***
(0.0349) (0.0295) (0.0294) (0.0272) (0.0334) (0.0548)
1.6.2.3 ATE, TT and TUT of Being a Bully
We now move to the calculation of treatment-effect measures for those who chose
to be bullies. Table 1.21 shows that being a bully at age 15 has costs later in life.
Our findings indicate that these cost are seen in term of an increase likelihood of
depression, and increase in tobacco use and higher levels of stress by the age of
18. Being a bully increases the likelihood of depression by a fourth of a standard
deviation, and increases the likelihood of tobacco use by more than half. As in the
case of victimization, bullies are more likely to be stressed both due to their image
and in general.
The reader should note that the bullying measures come from self reporting. This
is key to understand why some of the negative effects are larger for bullies than for
the victims. The treatments are not the same and the self-report of self-selection into
them has different connotations. What a given victim considers to be bullying, might
not be considered as bullying by the perpetrator. The perpetrator might consider a
joke or a tease, what the victim might regard as bullying. In that sense, the “being
a bully” treatment has a higher intensity than the “being bullied” treatment, and
therefore the scars left for the future differ in depth.
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Tab. 1.21: TE, TT and TUT of Being a Bully
Depre Smoking Sickness Mental StressImage StressTotal
ATE 1.0729*** 0.1216*** 0.0268 -0.0292 0.8905*** 3.7838***
(0.0354) (0.0271) (0.0271) (0.0273) (0.0314) (0.0691)
TT 1.0045*** 0.1175 0.0255 -0.0255 0.8693*** 3.6940***
(0.1255) (0.0975) (0.0973) (0.0981) (0.1123) (0.2449)
TUT 1.0787*** 0.1219*** 0.0269 -0.0296 0.8923*** 3.7914***
(.0369) (0.0283) (0.0282) (0.0285) (0.0327) (0.0720)
1.6.2.4 Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Skills on the ATE of Being a Bully and Being
a Bully
Now that we stablished the ATE of bullying on several outcomes, we can start break-
ing up that effect into the effects attributed to each level of latent skills. That is, we
can quantify the treatment effect for individuals with particular levels of cognitive and
non-cognitive skills. These results are best presented using 3D graphs with cognitive
and non-cognitive skills in the x and y axes and the treatment effect in the vertical
axis as in Heckman et al. (2006b) and Heckman et al. (2011b), among others.
Figures 1.2a and 1.2b show how the treatment effect of being bully and being
a bully depends on the levels of skills. We see that in both cases the increase in
the likelihood is a phenomenon that happens in the entire cognitive-noncognitive
space. Interestingly, we see that people with lower levels of cognitive skills have a
higher treatment effect for both treatments, while it is stable in the non-cognitive
skill dimension.
If we now focus on the incidence if smoking, we see very interesting patterns.
Figure 1.3a shows that while the effect of bullying on the victims is on average not
different from zero, bullied people with lower cognitive skills tend to smoke more. On
the contrary, Figure 1.3b shows that for former bullies, there is a positive effect of
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bullying on smoking for the entire cognitive-noncognitive space. However, this effect
diminishes with higher levels of non-cognitive skills. The treatment effect of being a
bully on smoking is the highest for people with low cognitive and non-cognitive skills.
For this subpopulation being a bully more than doubles the likelihood of smoking.
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In subsection 1.6.2.2 we showed that former bullying victims are more likely to
report poorer health. They reported feeling sick more frequently and were more likely
to be diagnosed with mental health problems. Figure 1.4a shows that the treatment
effect of being bullied on the likelihood of being sick is widespread and very stable
across the entire cognitive-noncognitive space. The treatment effect is not as stable
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for the likelihood of having mental health issues (see Figures 1.5a and 1.5b). In fact,
being bullied more than doubles the likelihood of having mental health issues for
people with low cognitive skills and high non-cognitive skills. The relation is very
different when the treatment considered is to be a bully. Although, never different
from zero, the effect entirely depends on the level of non-cognitive skills.
Finally, Figures 1.6a and 1.6b show that the treatment effects of being a victim
and being a bully on the likelihood of feeling stressed due to self-image is positive
almost for the entire cognitive-noncognitive space. However these effects are zero,
or close to zero, for people with high non-cognitive skills. That is bullying fosters
insecurity, and it happens significantly more to those people with low non-cognitive
skills.
All these results attest to the fact that skills not only affect bullying occurrence,
but also, they mediate the extent to which these undesired behaviors affect subsequent
outcomes, except those related to health.
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1.7 Bullying and Skill Investment
We have shown that non-cognitive skills are key determinants of bullying, both from
the victim and from the perpetrator side. In an exploratory exercise we re-estimated
the model from equation (1.18) to (1.22), but this time we included as controls vari-
49
ables that we believe can proxy skill investment. So if before we were controlling for
✓NCt , now we will control for ✓NCt and INCt , where INCt is a vector of non-cognitive
skills’ investment measures at time t. These investment measures include an index
of parental control that measures whether the parents know where the youth is, who
is he with and how long will he be there; an index of parental harmony that mea-
sures how much time the kid spends with their parents, whether she considers she is
treated with affection by them, if she believes her parents treat each other well, and
if her parents talk candidly and frequently with her; an index of parental abuse that
measure whether the household is a violent setting. We also include the measures of
school quality explained in Section (1.6.1.4).14 If we are willing to assume assume
that ✓NCt + INCt t ✓NCt+1 , we are then controlling for next period skills.
Our results are shown in the lower panel of Table 1.22. The top panel of the
table reproduces the original results just for comparison. Our findings show that the
introduction of investment controls reduces the point estimate of the effect of non-
cognitive skills on the likelihood of being bullied, being a bully and being a cyberbully.
Furthermore, less violence-prone parents and better schools reduce the incidence of
bullying. In addition, higher parental control deters cyberbullying. We believe this is
the case only for cyberbullying and not for physical bullying because while most of the
physical bullying happens at school, cyberbullying happens outside school, probably
at home or at friends’ homes.
Hence, if we control for t+1 skills, we see that the part of it that comes from period
t investment is a very strong bullying deterrent. Therefore, this exercise, exploratory
at best, suggest that the inertia caused by low non-cognitive skills in previous periods
14 Recall that the school quality measures are coded in a reverse scale where high numbers mean
less school quality.
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on higher likelihoods of being involved in bullying can be reversed through the mod-
ification of tangible scenarios like the improvement of schools –including teachers–
and diminishing aggressive behavior within households.
Tab. 1.22: Adding Investment Controls
Being Bullied Bully Cyberbully(New)
VARIABLES Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err
No Inv. Contr
Non-Cognitive -0.074*** (0.015) -0.025* (0.013) -0.066*** (0.020)
Cognitive 0.002 (0.007) -0.007 (0.006) -0.007 (0.009)
With Inv Contr
Non-Cognitive -0.054*** (0.016) 0.003 (0.014) -0.046** (0.021)
Cognitive 0.008 (0.007) -0.002 (0.007) -0.001 (0.010)
Inv Cont at t
ParentControl -0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) -0.006** (0.003)
ParentHarmony 0.001 (0.002) -0.002 (0.001) 0.001 (0.002)
ParentAbuse 0.006*** (0.002) 0.005** (0.002) 0.006** (0.003)
SchQuality 0.007*** (0.003) 0.008*** (0.002) 0.007** (0.004)
SchEnviron 0.004*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.003* (0.002)
Observations 2,862 2,862 2862
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1.8 Conclusions
To the best of our knowledge this is the first attempt to quantify the effect of bullying
on subsequent outcomes that explicitly deals with self-selection. We use a structural
model that relies on the identification of latent cognitive and non-cognitive skill en-
dowments to estimate the causal effect of being a victim of bullying and being a bully
on outcomes like depression, smoking, health and stress. We find that non-cognitive
skills reduce the likelihood of being a bully, a cyberbully and a victim of bullies. This
is not the case for cognitive skills. We also showed that the model we estimate is
able to recreate the observed choices and outcomes in our data. Therefore, we were
confident we could simulate appropriate counterfactuals using our model. The simula-
51
tion of the counterfactuals allowed us to calculate treatment effects in a self-selection
setting.
Our findings indicate that bullying victims have higher incidence of depression,
sickness, mental health issues and stress three years after being bullied. In the same
vein, having been a bully increases the likelihood of depression, increases tobacco use
and increases the feeling of stress. The sizes of these effects are by no means small,
which attest to the fact that bullying is a heavy burden that needs to be carried for
a long time. For instance, the incidence of health issues doubles due to bullying, and
the chances of being a tobacco user doubles among former bullies.
Our findings indicate that the investment in skill development is key in any policy
intended to fight bullying. We showed that the lack of skills increase the chances of
being bullied and being a bully, we also showed that when using some skill investment
controls, these effects went away. In addition, we showed that skills are mediators
that can exacerbate or palliate the effect of bullying on later outcomes. Therefore,
developing skills will not only reduce the incidence of bulling as there will be less
people prone to be perpetrators and victims, but also the effects of these incidents
would be lessened in a significant way.
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2. THE DYNAMIC CONSEQUENCES OF BULLYING ON SKILL
ACCUMULATION
2.1 Introduction
When Lim Jee-young, a South Korean woman from Daegu, read the suicide note left
by her 13-year-old son, she found out that her young Seung-min had repeatedly been
hit, robbed, burned and tortured by boys in his class.1 Unfortunately, this horrible
story is not unique. It repeats itself time and time again, not only in South Korea,
but all around he world. The Columbine High School shooting in 1999 is still fresh
in the collective memory of North Americans (US Department of Education, 2011),2
as well as the story of Phoebe Prince, the 15-year-old girl that committed suicide
in her house at South Hadley, Massachusetts, after having suffered several weeks of
harassment and attacks while in school.3 These and many other similar events—that
exemplify the immense costs borne by bullying victims and communities in general—
have increased the efforts made by societies to face and discuss bullying as behavioral
issue among young people.4
Chapter 1 introduced the definition psychologists give to a bullying victim as a
1 http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/25/world/asia/south-korea-school-bully/
2 A US Secret Service report shows that 2/3 of 37 school shootings involved attackers that felt
“persecuted, bullied, threatened, attacked or injured by others” (Vossekuil et al., 2002).
3 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/30/us/30bully.html?ref=us. This event induced the Mas-
sachusetts Senate to pass an anti-bullying law that carries her name.
4 Anti-bullying campaigns and laws have been implemented in the US, Canada, UK, Germany,
Scandinavia, Colombia and South Korea.
person that is repeatedly and intentionally exposed to injury or discomfort by others
in an environment where an imbalance of power exists (Olweus, 1997). The existence
of an imbalance of power is a key feature of bullying because this creates a sense of
defenselessness of the victim. He or she may be outnumbered, physically weaker or
less psychologically strong than the bullies (Smith and Brain, 2000). As noticed in
Chapter 1, Faris and Felmlee (2011) suggest that bullying thrives in contexts where
individuals need to show peer group status. Not surprisingly, schools are the perfect
setting for bullying.
Very little is known about the intermediate costs of bullying and its long-term
consequences. This Chapter contributes in bridging this gap by exploring the two-
way relation between bullying and cognitive and non-cognitive skills accumulation.
Cognitive skills and non-cognitive skills are critical to the development of successful
lives.5 Hence, in this Chapter, I explore how school bullying hampers the development
of successful adults by impeding optimal skill accumulation. In addition, I analyze
how cognitive and non-cognitive skills are themselves important determinants of in-
school victimization.
The proposed two-way relation between skills and bullying is based on facts about
child victimization that have been widely established by the psychological literature.
Psychologists have noticed not only that bullying victims suffer grave and long-lasting
consequences in terms of their emotional well being (Olweus, 1997; Smith and Brain,
2000, among many others), but also that the likelihood of being a victim increases
dramatically when the child has some behavioral vulnerability (Hodges et al., 1997).6
5 See the definition of cognitive and non-cognitive skills in Chapter 1
6 In fact, Hodges et al. (1997) show that the occurrence of chronic victimization needs two con-
ditions. First, the victim needs to display a behavioral vulnerability that may not only make the
kid irritant to his or her peer, but also may signal that he or she might not be able to defend him
or herself as they “cry easily, are anxious, lack humor, lack self confidence and self esteem”. Second,
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To analyze this two-way relation, I develop a model that embeds peer-influenced
skill contributions—like bullying—-in the skills accumulation process. I rely on the
facts that skills are malleable and dynamic (Cunha and Heckman, 2007), and that
many external conditions can influence the stock of skills an individual is endowed
with at a given point in time (OECD, 2014). Little is known on how skill accumula-
tion takes place, especially for non-cognitive skills. In particular, there is still a lot to
be learned about the evolution of both cognitive and non-cognitive skills throughout
childhood and teenage years, their dynamic interdependence, their two-way relation-
ship with skill investment, the role social settings have on their development, and
the long-term consequences of traumatic events and other skill-depleting forces like
bullying. This Chapter intends to fill these gaps by quantifying the stock of skills lost
to bullying by a given generation. The estimation strategy is based on the facts that
skills beget skills (Cunha et al., 2010), that skills affect the occurrence of bullying
(see Chapter 1), and that bullying affects skill accumulation. Bullying victimization
depletes current skill levels and not only lowers skill accumulation, but also makes
an individual more prone to experience bullying again in the future, creating a self-
reinforcing mechanism that generates a big burden to be carried during adulthood.
This intuition is developed in a dynamic model of skill formation in which the bullying
event is treated as a negative shock that depletes the existing stock of skills changing
negatively the skill accumulation path for the people involved.
Using a tractable model within the latent factor framework and extending the
theoretical contributions of Cunha et al. (2010), I estimate the parameters that govern
the process by which past skills determine future skills. I allow future skills to depend
victims occupy “a social position in the peer group that invites, disinhibits or permits aggressive
attacks towards the child” .
55
on current skills, current investment choices and whether one was bullied. I also
allow for the investment choices, which I treat as a latent factor as well, to depend
on the level of skills. In addition, I allow the bullying event to depend on both the
personal skills endowments and the skills distributions of the peer group each student
is exposed to. This setting allows me to estimate both the direct (i.e., how bullying
at t affects future skills at t + 1) and indirect (i.e., how bullying at t affects future
skills at t + 2 through changes in skills at t + 1 ) channels through which bullying
affects skill accumulation.
This Chapter contributes to the economic literature in several ways. First, it in-
quires about the process of skill accumulation by providing a model that introduces
peer characteristics into the dynamics of skill accumulation. Second, it analyzes the
consequences of disruptive behavior in school in terms of skill depletion. Third, it
extends my previous work on school bullying (see Chapter 1), where I found sizable
consequences borne during adulthood, by providing additional insight into the chan-
nels through which high school bullying affects adult outcomes. Fourth, it allows the
quantification of the long-run cost of bullying to a generation. That is, I can go be-
yond school absenteeism and in-school stress, and estimate skill endowments loses for
life. In addition, this will open an auspicious research agenda on skill accumulation
and victimization in schools. The analysis could be extended in many directions. For
instance, we could inquire the extent to which bullying can affect skill accumulation
of non-direct victims, just because of the disruptiveness of the event.
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2.2 Related Literature
This work relates with two branches of the literature: bullying and skill formation.
The related literature on bullying has already been reviewed in Section 1.2. However,
let me add some additional references that are key in understanding different aspects
of school bullying and it consequences in a dynamic setting. It is important to mention
that just as he found that school and class size are not significant determinants of the
likelihood of bullying, Olweus (1997) finds that nor are personal characteristics like
disabilities, obesity, hygiene, posture and dress. However, he finds that victims are
often smaller than attackers, and Lowenstein (1978) finds that victimized kids have
more odd mannerisms than non-victimized kids. Kim (2005) shows that victimized
children are more likely to suffer bed wetting, sleep difficulties, anxiety, loneliness and
isolation, while Dake et al. (2003) find that bullied children are also more likely to
feel lonely. All these analyses, although descriptive as they are unable to find causal
effects, provide a critical input in the definition of the models I use in my own work.
In this Chapter, I contribute to the analysis of bullying literature by building on
the findings of Chapter 1 and providing an explanation for how the difference in the
outcomes observed in that Chapter materialize. That is, while Chapter 1 estimates
the ATE of youth bullying on adult outcomes, in this present Chapter, I elucidate
how these gaps are created, showing bullying as the triggering event that determines
a divergence in skill accumulation paths.
Now let me turn to the literature on skill development, which remains scarce,
even though it has benefitted from a number of recent contributions (Cunha et al.,
2006, 2010). One of the main reasons for this scarcity is that it is difficult to directly
measure cognitive and non-cognitive skills. At best, survey and administrative data
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contain measures that indirectly reflect underlying or latent skills. Structural models,
like the one used in this dissertation, are needed to fully address this issue. Another
difficulty arises due to the need of special longitudinal data sets that interview the
subjects several times throughout particular periods of their life. Often this kind of
data sets focus on labor, income and other economic dynamics and do not collect the
measures needed to quantify skills.
What do we know so far? We know that skills are dynamic and malleable. That
is, they depend on their past levels, they can be hindered and they can be fostered.
Cunha et al. (2006) show that skills beget skills and therefore initial skill endow-
ments and early accumulation are critical for the lifetime stock of skills. Based on
this, they show that skill gaps between children from rich families and children from
disadvantaged families start to widen at early ages. This gives foundation to the call
for early childhood development and preschool interventions (Knudsen et al., 2006;
Doyle et al., 2009). Skills beget skills not only though the natural process of getting
the stock available at time t to t + 1, but also though investment. There is some
evidence on the fact that skills encourage skill investment. That is, skilled kids have
higher levels of skill investment that lower skilled kids (Skinner and Belmont, 1993;
Espinoza et al., 2014).7
The claim that skills are malleable is backed up by a series of papers that show that
skill developing interventions were able to modify the stock of skills of the treated
population. For instance, Heckman et al. (2010) show that the people treated by
Perry Preschool Program have higher non-cognitive skills—although similar levels
of cognitive skills—than the controls. The Socio-Emotional Learning programs have
7 Although this feature of skill dynamics is widely proposed in Cunha et al. (2010), their theoretical
claim of skills inducing higher levels of investment is only backed up by their empirical estimates in
very early stages of life (i.e., before two years of age).
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been widely reviewed as successful interventions that develop non-cognitive skills such
as goal setting, conflict resolution and decision making (Payton et al., 2008). Cunha
et al. (2010) show that skill developing interventions can compensate for low initial
level of both cognitive and non-cognitive skills. There is evidence, however, that there
are windows of opportunity outside of which skill malleability is lost (Knudsen et al.,
2006). Cunha et al. (2006) argue that such window closes earlier for cognitive than
for non-cognitive skills.
Besides the dynamism and malleability features of skills, recent literature has
found that they strongly depend on different contexts the child grows in.8 For in-
stance, extensive literature finds that family background influences skill accumulation:
children whose parents are more engaged in their upbringing are likely to have higher
levels of both types of skill.9 The quality of school inputs such as class size and
teacher characteristics also affects non-cognitive skills (Fredriksson et al., 2013; Jack-
son, 2013). Skill endowments have even been found to depend on the level of stress
a person was exposed to during childhood (McEwen and Seeman, 2006).
2.3 Skill Formation With Peer-Influenced Investment
Economic and psychological literature has found skills to be dynamic and prone to be
influenced by many external conditions. Hence, my framework needs to incorporate
five facts that result from this literature: i. skills beget skills, ii. skill development
can be affected by investment choices, iii. past skills levels can affect next period skills
indirectly by inducing skill investment, iv. bullying can hamper skill development,
8 See OECD (2014) for a full framework about such contexts.
9 See Hart and Risley (1995); Cunha et al. (2006); Heckman and Masterov (2007); Cabrera et al.
(2007); Kiernan and Huerta (2008); Tough (2012)
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and v. bullying depends also on the stock of cognitive and non-cognitive skills of each
person and those of his or her peers. Therefore, I propose to augment the dynamic
structure in Cunha et al. (2010) to explicitly incorporate these five facts. Let the
stock of skills S = {A,B} a person i that belongs to classroom c has at time t + 1
(i.e., ✓S,i2c,t+1) be a result of a CES skill production function whose inputs are the
stock of skills she had at time t (✓A,i2c,t and ✓B,i2c,t), the skill investment choices done
between the two periods (IS,i2c,t), and the occurrence of a skill depleting shock like
bullying (Mi2c,t). Furthermore, I allow for the investment choice and the of bullying


















Mi2c,t+1 = h (✓A,i2c,t, ✓B,i2c,t, ✓A, i2c,t)
for S = {A,B}, where  M,t = 1  A,t  B,t  I,t and  i 2 c indicates all individuals
that belong to classroom c except i. Let Nc be the total number of students in
classroom c, where c 2 C.
This structure relates parental investment choices with victimization at t + 1
indirectly through its effect on the stock of skills at t. This relies on the results
of psychological research that indicates that responsive and supporting parenting
practices are related with lower levels of bullying (Flouri and Buchanan, 2002). In
particular, certain parental behaviors that hamper the development of locus of control
on kids have been linked with in-school victimization (Ladd and Ladd, 1998).
In the system of equations (2.1), h (·) is a function that maps RNc+1 ! R repre-
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senting a sufficient statistic that relates the skills available to other students in the
classroom c with those of individual i 2 c that affects the likelihood of i being bullied.
Through function h (·), I incorporate two stylized facts of bullying established by the
psychological literature: i. that there are personal characteristics of the student that
influences the chances of being bullied (i.e., behavioral issues), and ii. that there are
characteristics of the peer group that set him or her apart from his or her classmates
(e.g., lacks friends, is rejected by the peer-group) (Hodges et al., 1997). Function
h (·) responds to the fact that bullying needs a social arena in which the imbalances
of power take place allowing classmates to play different roles: victim, perpetrator
and bystanders.10 Therefore, the question that arises is: what separates bystanders
from victims. Due to its social setting, one may be inclined to look for answers to
this question in the social interactions literature as in Schelling (1971), Pollak (1976)
and Manski (1993), where agents interact through their decisions. The problem with
bullying is that no one decides to be a victim. Hence, while the social interactions
literature explains “why do members of the same group tend to behave similarly”
(Manski, 2000), we are instead interested in answering “why is this kid chosen among
the rest”. Hence, “selection into bullying” is non-random and, like in a social interac-
tions situation, it depends on characteristics of the victim and its classmates, but in
a very different way. The idea is that individual i with skills set (✓A,i,t, ✓B,i,t) might
be bullied in classroom c but not in classroom c0. This difference depends on the
skill distribution of the other students that belong to each classroom. This defines
a different dimension of peer-influenced consequences. Therefore, identification relies
on the assumption that the allocation of individual i to classroom c was exogenous,
10 Psychology literature has identified six types of classmates: ringleader bullies, follower bullies,
reinforcers, defenders, bystanders and victims (Salmivalli et al., 1996). Due to data and computa-
tional restrictions, I compress the types of classmates to three: bullies, bystanders and victims.
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and therefore the assignment of i’s classmates is as good as random.11
The choice of the CES as the production function of skills responds to two main
reasons. First, its capability to smoothly introduce investment and bullying as inputs
together with past levels of skill. Second, it provides the curvature needed to explore
complementarities between the inputs involved in the skill production function. In
particular, the static complementarity (@2✓S,t+1/@IS,t+1@✓S,t) and the dynamic comple-
mentarity (@2✓S,t+1/@IS,t+1@IS,t), concepts introduced by Cunha and Heckman (2008) to
describe how the current stock of skills affect the productivity of skill investment, and
how much of that productivity of investment is leveraged by past investment choices.
I will use the same concepts to analyze the skill depleting power of the bullying event.








11 This framework is particularly relevant in the South Korean context where after 1969 a “leveling
policy” was introduced to regulate student placement. According to Kang (2007) “the law requires
that elementary school graduates be randomly (by lottery) assigned to middle schools —either
public or private— in the relevant residence-based school district.” The leveling policy also makes
the grouping of students by ability and achievement levels “extremely rare”. These features let Kang
(2007) claim that “the non-grouping (or ability mixing) in school exposes students to a classroom
peer group that is nearly exogenously and randomly determined.” Furthermore, the reader should
note that unlike in the US, middle-school students in South Korea have a fixed classroom —and
hence, classmates— for all subjects.
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2.4 Empirical Strategy
As mentioned in Section 1.5, the key feature of the empirical strategy is the way it
deals with the fact that underlying cognitive and non-cognitive skills and investment
preferences are latent rather than observable.12 They are not well defined entities
with measurement scales and instruments, like height and weight are. Instead, these
latent constructs need to be inferred from scores, called manifest variables, that can
be directly observed and measured (Bartholomew et al., 2011).
In this Section, first I present how I use manifest scores to identify the latent
variables of interest and then, based on that, I show how this allows me to estimate
the full model.
2.4.1 Identification of Latent Factors’ Distributions: From the Static to the
Dynamic Setting
The core of the empirical strategy is the assumption of a linear relation between the
manifest and the latent variables, that can be thought of as a production function of
scores, whose inputs include both the individual observable characteristics and the
latent endowments. In that sense, the empirical strategy incorporates the fact that
the observed manifest values respond not only to the latent variables of interest (✓),











12 In this dissertation I use the terms latent variables and unobserved heterogeneity interchangeably.
While the term latent variables is widely used in statistics, the literature in labor economics prefers
the term unobserved heterogeneity to differentiate it from the latent variable models that give the
basis of probits, logits, censored and truncated estimations.
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where Tt is a L⇥1 vector of measurements (e.g., test scores) at time t, Xt,T is a matrix
with all observable controls for each measurement at time t and ↵tT,A and ↵T,Bt , are







that all the elements of the L ⇥ 1 vector eTt are mutually independent and have
associated distributions feht (·) for every h = 1, . . . , L.
13
Carneiro et al. (2003), based on the insights of Kotlarski (1967), show that identi-
fication of the loadings in (2.4) (up to one normalization14) and the (diagonal) matrix
of the variances of the latent factors ⌃✓ needs three restrictions:
R1 Orthogonality of the factors (i.e., ✓A ? ✓B).
R2 L to be at least 2k + 1, where k is the number of latent factors in the model.15




























which indicates that the first three manifest scores are affected by the first factor
13 Identification of latent investment preferences in skill S, ISt , follows the same structure:
IS,t = Xt,I ISt + ↵
IS
t IA,t + e
IS
t
where IS,t is a vector with the investment manifest scores.
14 That is, one of the loadings ↵T,·t of each factor should be set equal to 1, and the estimation of all
the rest of the loadings should be interpreted as relative to those used as nummeraire.
15 For simplicity, I will assume that I have 3k measurements in a measurement system like (2.4).
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only, while the second three manifest scores are affected by both latent factors.16
However, these restrictions only apply to cases where there are no factor dynamics
involved in the estimation. It is easy to see that Restriction R1 cannot be sustained
if we believe there are dynamics governing the production of factor endowments at







for S = {A,B}, ✓At+1 6? ✓Bt+1 holds because of common past
influences. That is, ✓At+1 and ✓Bt+1 are correlated because both share common inputs
✓At and ✓Bt , even if each latent factor has its own production function gA (·, ·) and
gB (·, ·).
In order to get rid of the orthogonality assumption of contemporaneous latent
factors R1 and still be able to identify the latent factors’ distributions and loadings
from a measurement system like (2.4), I need to rely on a factor structure different
from the one required in Restriction R3. I need to assume a factor structure (2.5)
where ↵T6,A = 0 (i.e., for each latent factor, there is at least one manifest score that
is only affected by that factor).
Theorem 1. If ✓At+1 6? ✓Bt+1 and there is, at least one test score per latent factor that
depends only on one latent factor, then the factor loadings of a measurement system
like (2.4) are identified.
16 The loading structure of (2.4) depends entirely on the data available. Ideally, researchers have
three measures for each factor, where each measure depends only on one factor. That is, in system



























However, this is not often the case. There are many measures that depend on both latent factors.
For instance, grades and education achievement scores may depend not only on a cognitive factor,
but also on a non-cognitive one (Heckman et al., 2011a).
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Proof. See Appendix K.1
Contrary to common practice latent factor literature, I do not impose normality
to the distribution of the factors f✓A,✓B (·, ·). Instead, I use the mixture of normals
in order to achieve the flexibility required to mimic the true underlying distributions
of the latent endowments. The mixture of normals not only grants flexibility in the
type of distribution it is able to replicate, but also allows numerical integration using
the Gauss-Hermite quadrature, which is particularly useful for calculating E [f (X)]







Xt,T1 , Tt,1, ⇣
A, ⇣B
 
⇥ · · ·⇥ feLt
 









where I integrate over the distributions of the factors due to their unobservable




t , F̂✓At (·) and F̂✓Bt (·).
Using this latent variable framework allows me to use a construct that lacks metric
and measuring instruments and disentangle the variation of interest (i.e., that one
that comes from the unobserved heterogeneity) from the one generated by random
shocks and the one that comes from exogenous observable traits like gender or age. In
fact, variance decompositions of the test scores used for the estimation and presented
in Figure 2.1 show that latent endowments explain between 5 to 9 times more the
variation of the scores than the observable characteristics. However, Figure 2.1 also
shows that even after controlling for latent endowments more that half of the variation
of the scores is still unexplained. Hence, these findings are in line with the argument
against the use test scores as proxies of abilities.
17 The structural estimations presented in this Chapter were done using the heterofactor com-
mand for Stata developed by Miguel Sarzosa and Sergio Urzua (Sarzosa and Urzua, 2012).
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Locus## Respons# SelfEst# Lang# Math# YrTest#
Unobservables# Latent#Endowments# Observables#
2.4.2 Dynamic Estimation
2.4.2.1 Identification and Estimation Steps
As explained above, the core of the empirical strategy is that ✓S,t and IS,t 8S, t are
unobservable factors. Therefore, we need to estimate all the parameters of equa-
tions (2.4), and of the dynamic model (2.1) using maximum likelihood estimation
procedures by integrating over the distributions that describe the latent factors. In
this section, I will describe the steps and the identification sources involved in the
estimation of the dynamic process described in (2.1).
Suppose the data we use follows individuals for two time periods: t and t + 1.
Although in the actual estimations I use a triangular loading matrix like (2.5) with
↵T6,A = 0, for simplicity suppose the manifest cognitive and non-cognitive scores have




























































where TS,⌧ is a 3 ⇥ 1 vector that contains each of the test scores associated to skill
S = {A,B} at time ⌧ = {t, t + 1}, and IS,t+1 is a 3 ⇥ 1 vector that contains each
of the investment measures made in skill S = {A,B} at time t + 1. As shown in
the previous section, we can use equations (2.8) and (2.9) to identify F̂✓A,t,✓B,t (·, ·),
and equations (2.12) and (2.13) to identify F̂IS,t+1 (·). Also, we can use (2.10) and
(2.11) to consistently estimate F̂✓A,t+1,✓B,t+1 (·, ·) and  ̂
TS
t+1. In consequence, I are able
to construct the vectors














We now substitute the CES production function from (2.1) in the 3⇥ 1 measure-
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where  M,t = 1   A,t    B,t    I,t, from which I can identify  A,t,  B,t,  I,t and ⇢
through a ML estimation assuming additive separability of the error term eTSt+1 and
taking advantage of the fact that I have already identified ↵TSt+1. Hence, the likelihood





























































































Note that given that I allow Xt,T and Xt+1,T to have a constant term, the esti-
mated factors are centered at zero. That is, overall skill means are absorbed in the
constant terms of the  T3,S⌧ vectors for ⌧ = {t, t+ 1} in equations (2.8) through (2.11).
Estimation relies on that fact to identify ⇢ as shown in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. If E [✓A,t] = 0, E [✓B,t] = 0, the error e is additive separable in ✓t+1 =
f (✓t,  , ⇢) + e, and f (✓t,  , ⇢) is double differentiable , the parameter ⇢ is identified
out of the fact that E [✓·,t+1] = 0
Proof. See Appendix K.2
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Theorem 2 has an important implication regarding what I am able to capture in
the dynamic process. The parameters estimated from (2.1) exclude effects due to
the overall mean changes in skills. Suppose for instance, that everyone’s cognitive
skills increase on average by ✏ from t to t + 1, such overall improvement does not
affect the estimates of  A,t,  B,t,  I,t and ⇢ . That is, my dynamic process will only
capture idiosyncratic changes along the distributions. However, I can rely in the
findings of Urzua (2008) who shows that under mild linearity assumptions in the
measurement systems (2.8) through (2.11), I can claim that the mean of the skills
is given by the coefficients in  T3,S⌧ associated with the constant term, call them
 
T3,S
⌧ [1] for ⌧ = {t, t+ 1}. Therefore, I can retrieve the overall mean changes of






2.4.2.2 The Choice of h (·) and the Identification of the Bullying Equation
As explained above, psychologists have established that in-school victimization occur-
rence requires some intrinsic characteristics of the person herself and characteristics
of the person vis-a-vis the peer group (Hodges et al., 1997). The personal intrin-
sic traits are introduced in function h (·) through the observable and unobservable
characteristics. The characteristics within the group, that is, the characteristics that
“invite, disinhibits, or permits” attacks towards a given child are modeled by how
uncommon in terms of particular traits the potential victim is. This uncommonness
feature is important because it relates with several established facts in the psycholog-
ical literature. First, that there needs to exist and imbalance of power (Olweus, 1997;
Smith and Brain, 2000), therefore a kid with uncommon characteristics is less likely
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to have friends who can defend him or her (Bukowski et al., 1995). Also, bullies are
more likely to attack those with no friends (Hodges and Perry, 1996). Furthermore,
kids with uncommon characteristics are more easily regarded as weird and unlikeable,
which fosters peer rejection (Hodges et al., 1997).18
The measure of rarity or uncommonness is materialized in my model by the num-
ber of classmates that lie inside an epsilon-ball in the skills or income space that is
defined around those qualities for every kid. The intuition is that if your charac-
teristics set you apart, meaning there are no kids similar to you, you have higher
chances of being bullied. So, if r ,i2c (d) is the number of classmates of i that lie in




XM , (✓A, ✓B)i2c,t ,r ,i2c (d) , µc
⌘
(2.17)
Where µc is a school fixed effect that responds to the fact that there are several
school characteristics like teachers quality, or overall faculty tolerance to bullying that
influence the likelihood of bullying victimization (Dake et al., 2003). In addition,
I incorporate school district fixed-effects to properly take advantage of the school
allocation randomness in the South Korean education system.
This way to introduce classmates’ characteristics is also econometrically advan-
tageous as it goes around the well known problem of peer-effect identification. Ac-
cording to Angrist (2014) randomness in peer allocation is not sufficient to identify
peer-effects. He claims that, in order to prevent the unwanted existence of mechanical
statistical forces that create spurious correlations, the econometrician needs that not
18 Dake et al. (2003) show that students that scored higher on a scale of social acceptance were
less likely to be bullied by their peers.
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everyone within the group becomes affected or “treated” by the same peer-effect.19 In
my approach, the uncommonness measure allows for a different “treatment” for every
observation to the point that, although everyone is affected by what happens inside
their particular epsilon-ball, the relative position of those classmates that do not fall
within that epsilon-ball is irrelevant.
In the estimations presented in this Chapter I consider bullying to be a dichoto-
mous variable that takes the value of 1 if the person i was bullied and 0 if not. Hence,
in this particular case, (2.17) becomes
E [Mt+1] =  
⇣
XM,i2c 




t+1 r ,i2c (d) + µc
⌘
where   (·) is the normal CDF.
2.5 Data
I empirically estimate the described model using the same data set used in Chapter
1. That is the Junior High School Panel (JHSP) of the Korean Youth Panel Survey
(KYP). In this case, I choose to use these data motivated by two reasons. First,
bullying is a very important social issue in the South Korean society, probably more
so than anywhere else in the world as they have an active policy aimed to curve
the incidence of suicide. Suicide figures in South Korea are striking. It causes 31.7
deaths per 100,000 people, the single highest rate in the world. Suicide is the largest
cause of death for people between 15 and 24, killing 13 for every 100,000 people in
this age range. One school-aged kid (10 to 19 years old) commits suicide each day.
19 For instance, measuring peer-effects by introducing a classroom mean is invalid as everyone is
being “treated” by that classroom mean which will create a tautological relation captured in the
regression by the coefficient associated with the mean.
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Suicide is often linked with school bullying. Statistics of the South Korean Education
Ministry show that more than 77,000 students admitted to being bullied, and nearly
10 percent of those said they had considered suicide. In response to this, bullying
has recently been placed at the center of social policy in South Korea by president
Park Geun-hye as it has been considered to be one of the “four social evils” together
with sexual assault, domestic violence and food contamination.20 Since 2012, the
government installed more than 100,000 closed-circuit cameras in school facilities to
prevent bullying and prosecute its perpetrators.
The second reason to focus on South Korea is data availability and KYP-JHSP’s
unique sampling scheme that allows the identification of peer characteristics. The
KYP-JHSP is a longitudinal survey that started in 2003 sampling full junior high-
school classrooms (i.e., 14 year olds) from which all the students were interviewed.21
They were interviewed once a year until 2008. Thus, they were followed though
high-school and into the beginning of their adult life.
A more detailed description of the data set is presented in Section 1.3. Further-
more, Subsections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2 describe the procedures and data used to construct
the non-cognitive and cognitive measures respectively.
2.5.1 Reported Bullying
Bullying, as all other personal characteristic that was collected in the KYP-JHSP, is
self-reported by the students. It refers to events where they have been severely teased
or bantered, threatened, collectively harassed, severely beaten, or robbed. Hence,
even though psychologists have constructed a very wide definition for bullying which
20 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-26080052
21 I find that there is at least one bully and one victim in every sampled classroom. This goes in
line with the findings of Schuster (1999) in German schools.
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I presented in the introduction of Chapter 1, the kids in the study respond to the
most direct and less subtle versions of bullying. This is in line with the findings
in several international studies (see Madsen, 1996; Smith and Levan, 1995; Smith
et al., 1999, 2002) where children have been found to “focus on the more obvious and
less subtle forms of bullying such as direct verbal and physical abuse and overlook
indirect aggression” (Naylor et al., 2010).22 In the same way, the reported incidence
of bullying in the KYP-JHSP, presented in Table 2.1, is in line with the incidence
reported in international studies (see Smith and Brain, 2000, for a summary).
Tab. 2.1: Incidence of Bullying by Wave
Bullied Bullied in t = 1
Wave No Yes
1 .22499 · ·
2 .11198 .07377 .24271
3 .04768 .03270 .16871
4 .03428 .02275 .25517
5 .02231 .01941 .11340
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Skill Distributions
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show the results of the estimation on the measurement system
used to identify the joint skill distribution for t = 1 and t = 2, respectively. These
distributions are presented in Figure 2.2a and 2.2b. They show that skill distributions
are far from normal, and that there is a positive correlation between both dimensions
of skills. In fact it is estimated to be of about 0.3869 for t = 1 and 0.358 for t = 2.
This indicates that kids with high levels of one skill tend to have high levels of the
22 This focus tends to collect versions of bulling that, to some extent, are more likely to happen
among boys than among girls. Gender-specific analysis of bullying and its consequences is very
important, but it will be addressed in later research.
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other skills as well. An additional interesting feature of the joint skills distribution is
the fact that the variance of non-cognitive skills increases for higher levels of cognitive-
skills. Figure 2.3 shows kernel densities of non-cognitive skills for deciles 5, 6, 7 and 8
of the cognitive skills’ distribution at t = 1. Hence, socio-emotional abilities, although
positively correlated with cognitive skills, are less so for smarter kids.
Tab. 2.2: Identification of Skills at t = 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Locus Irrespons Self-est Lang-SSc Math-Scie YearExam
Age (months) -0.009* 0.015*** -0.014*** -0.008* -0.009** -0.014***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Male 0.150*** -0.055 0.170*** 0.024 0.312*** -0.037
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.031) (0.032) (0.026)
Older Sibs 0.017 -0.006 -0.017 -0.045 0.032 0.009
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.029) (0.030) (0.026)
Young Sibs 0.016 -0.069** 0.023 0.077** 0.086*** 0.086***
(0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.030) (0.031) (0.026)
lnInc_pc 0.074** -0.104*** 0.022 0.150*** 0.145*** 0.126***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.029) (0.029) (0.025)
Urban 0.172*** -0.084 0.065 0.101** 0.067 -0.016
(0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.045) (0.046) (0.036)
Lives With:
BothParents 0.209** -0.313*** 0.275*** 0.314*** 0.369*** 0.235***
(0.102) (0.101) (0.103) (0.091) (0.093) (0.086)
OnlyMother 0.325** -0.274** 0.428*** 0.282** 0.354*** 0.072
(0.136) (0.135) (0.137) (0.120) (0.123) (0.110)
Father Edu:
2yrColl 0.133* -0.147** -0.022 0.145** 0.197*** 0.205***
(0.072) (0.071) (0.072) (0.061) (0.063) (0.051)
4yrColl 0.141*** -0.142*** 0.087** 0.317*** 0.187*** 0.245***
(0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.037) (0.038) (0.031)
GradSch 0.263*** -0.321*** 0.148* 0.464*** 0.288*** 0.317***
(0.076) (0.075) (0.076) (0.063) (0.065) (0.049)
No-Cog Factor 1.213*** -1.258*** 1 0.864*** 0.934***
(0.090) (0.096) · (0.110) (0.115)
Cogn Factor 0.533*** 0.503*** 1
(0.026) (0.027) ·
Constant -0.755*** 0.837*** -0.408** -1.128*** -1.273*** -0.786***
(0.174) (0.173) (0.175) (0.157) (0.160) (0.148)
Observations 3,097
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimations include region
fixed-effects. Factor distributions estimated using a mixture of two normals
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Tab. 2.3: Identification of Skills at 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Locus Irrespons Self-est Lang-SSc Math-Scie YearExam
Age (months) -0.023*** 0.008 -0.008 -0.013*** -0.008* -0.018***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Male 0.112*** -0.067* 0.136*** 0.059* 0.366*** -0.058**
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.033) (0.033) (0.026)
Older Sibs 0.034 -0.016 0.055 -0.004 0.013 0.023
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.032) (0.032) (0.027)
Young Sibs 0.041 -0.092** 0.078** 0.143*** 0.125*** 0.082***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.033) (0.033) (0.029)
lnInc_pc 0.087** -0.039 0.068* 0.158*** 0.164*** 0.171***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.034) (0.033) (0.030)
Urban 0.099* -0.005 0.023 0.084* 0.059 -0.099**
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.050) (0.050) (0.039)
Lives With:
BothParents -0.079 -0.186** 0.062 0.286*** 0.411*** 0.302***
(0.087) (0.087) (0.088) (0.076) (0.075) (0.062)
OnlyMother 0.022 -0.244* 0.141 0.068 0.214* 0.220**
(0.132) (0.132) (0.132) (0.114) (0.113) (0.092)
Father Edu:
2yrColl -0.004 -0.209*** 0.102 0.088 0.187*** 0.178***
(0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.066) (0.065) (0.052)
4yrColl 0.112** -0.166*** 0.105** 0.295*** 0.219*** 0.253***
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.039) (0.039) (0.030)
GradSch 0.211** -0.245*** 0.119 0.358*** 0.304*** 0.346***
(0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.076) (0.075) (0.058)
No-Cog Factor 1.190*** -1.325*** 1 1.351*** 1.160***
(0.109) (0.131) · (0.215) (0.179)
Cogn Factor 0.405*** 0.461*** 1
(0.039) (0.034) ·
Constant -0.328 0.445** -0.499** -1.125*** -1.419*** -0.937***
(0.200) (0.201) (0.201) (0.181) (0.180) (0.163)
Observations 2,731
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimations include region
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Note: Non-cognitive skills kernel densities for selected deciles of cognitive skills.
2.6.2 Investment Factors
As explained in Section 2.4, skills are not the only unobserved characteristics that
enter the model. Investment choices made by the family are also unobserved factors.
Hence, I estimate the underlying distributions from which the unobserved heterogene-
ity in investment comes from. That is, I estimate the measurement system described
by equations (2.12) and (2.13).
The manifest variables used as measures of investment depend on the type of
skill they intend to develop. I use measures of good parenting as indicator scores
for investment choices in non-cognitive skills, namely parental physical and verbal
abuse, parental control and parental harmony. The first measure indicates how often
is the child beaten, physically hurt, yelled at or addressed in an inappropriate manner
by the parents. Parental control relates to how well parents know where the kid is,
who is she with, what is she doing and when is she coming back home. Parental
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harmony collects information related the level of care and interest in her life the kid
feels from her parents.23 The measures used to identify the cognitive skill investment
factor relate to the enrollment in private tutoring of each kid. South Korean society
is characterized by the high importance it gives to academic success. Hence, it is
not uncommon for kids to be enrolled in after-school academic programs. By age
14, around four fifths of the kids in the survey attend some kind of tutoring. As
manifest variables of cognitive skill investment I use a scale of how private—meaning
how many classmates there are in every tutoring session, in a reversed scale—the
tutoring is, the time spent in tutoring, and the cost of the tutoring.24
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 present the estimation of the investment in non-cognitive and
cognitive skill factors respectively. The results show that the non-cognitive investment
factor identified closely relates with good parental practices as it correlates positively
with parental control and negatively with physical and verbal abuse. In the same
way, the cognitive investment factor identified relates with the quality of after-class
tutoring. It is positively correlated with how private the tutoring is, and how many
hours the student spends in such after-class activities.
The non-cognitive investment distributions identified, presented in Figure 2.4,
show a remarkable stability of the factor across wave. On the other hand, the cognitive
investment distributions, presented in Figure 2.5, show two important characteristics.
First, they are bimodal. That is the case because there are a proportion of kids that
23 See Appendix I for a detailed explanation of the questions used to create each score
24 The information used to inquire about investment in the development of cognitive skills related
entirely on the usage of private tutoring. The first score, named type of tutoring, collect information
of the nature of the extra-school classes taken. That is, whether the classes were entirely private,
with few classmates, with many classmates, or through the internet. Students gave this type of
information about their tutoring for every subject (e.g., language, math, science), and based on that
I created aggregated measures. The second and third score used were straightforward: the amount





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































take no tutoring at all. Second, they are not stable in time. This responds to the fact
that participation private tutoring falls as kids grow up.
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2.6.3 Results from the Dynamic Model
2.6.3.1 Incidence of victimization
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 show the relation between skills and selection into bullying.25 In
line with the results in Chapter 1, kids with less non-cognitive skills are significantly
more likely to be bullied. Based on these estimates, the model allows me to quantify
the probability of selection into bullying for each combination of skills at a given
point in time. Figure 2.6a does this for t = 1 (age 14). It shows striking differences
in the likelihood of being bullied depending on the level of non-cognitive skills. Kids
in the first decile of non-cognitive skills have around a 50% chance of being bullied,
while those chances for kids in the first decile is virtually zero. An standard deviation
increase in non-cognitive skills reduces the likelihood of being bullied by 22 percentage
points for the average student. That is, such increase in skills will reduce practically
to zero the chances of being victimized.
Table 2.6 also shows the importance the relation between own and peer character-
istics has in determining peer victimization. Controlling for observable characteristics
and skill levels, youths who were placed in a school in which their non-cognitive skills
are uncommon are significantly more likely to be bullied. The results indicate that
the likelihood of victimization of the average student drops by one percentage point
for each additional classmate with similar non-cognitive skill endowments he has. In-
25 Given that the kids are already 14 years old by the first time they are interviewed, there is a
possibility for the existence of joint causality between the contemporaneous measures of bullying and
skills. I address this issue using the framework described in Hansen et al. (2004) and the exogenous
variation that comes from the allocation of students to schools and classrooms. Hansen et al.
(2004) require two additional assumptions for identification. First, the assumption of separability
between the observed and unobserved part in every equation of the measurement system. Second,
the assumption of orthogonality across the error terms in the complete measurement system. This
last one is a very mild condition as every equation is being controlled not only for observable
characteristics but also for the unobserved heterogeneity, which is theorized to be the only source
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terestingly, the same occurs in terms of income. Bullying probability falls by half a
percentage point for each additional classmate that has a family income level that
falls within the epsilon-ball defined around the family income level of the prospective
victim.
As I showed in Table 2.1, the incidence of bullying falls as the kids become older.
In fact from wave one to wave two the incidence of being bullied is cut by more than
half, falling from 22.5% to 11.12%. However, the results in Table 2.7 and in Figure
2.6b show that victimization is not reduced across the board. In fact, while the
probability of being bullied has fallen virtually to zero for the kids in the last seven
non-cognitive skill deciles, the kids in the first decile remain with similar probabilities
of being bullied than a year before, around four times the average. Hence, it is fair
to say that in time bullying becomes more selective of its victims, overwhelmingly
focusing on kid that lack non-cognitive abilities.
Table 2.7 indicates that the relation between own and peer characteristics becomes
even more important at age 15. Non-cognitive skills uncommonness significantly
increases victimization likelihood even more so than before. My results indicate that
bullying probability falls by 1.7 percentage points per each additional classmate whose
non-cognitive skills fall within the epsilon-ball defined around the non-cognitive skills
of the prospective victim.
An important distinction with the empirical strategy in Chapter 1 is that in the
present Chapter I allow for correlated skills. Once I allow for this correlation to exist,
I find a positive effect of cognitive skills on the likelihood of being bullied; an effect
that is not reported in Chapter 1. This is a very interesting finding as it reflects the
fact that the kids that are more likely to be bullied are those who are smart but lack
87
non-cognitive skills. However, Figures 2.6a and 2.6b show that any positive effect
cognitive skills may have is dwarfed by the negative effect of non-cognitive skills.
2.6.3.2 Skills Production
Table 2.8 presents the results of estimating the system described by (2.1). In the
first part of the table, I present the raw estimates of the dynamic parameters. Using
these structural parameters—including the one related to selection into bullying, I
am able to fully recreate the dynamic process. This process is presented in Figures
2.7a, 2.7c, 2.8a and 2.8c. Figures 2.7a and 2.8a show that high non-cognitive skills
produce high future non-cognitive skills, and that marginal increments of those initial







space, see Figure 2.9a). These figures also demonstrate that
cognitive skills are unimportant in non-cognitive skill production process except for
the fact that higher initial cognitive skills make the marginal increments of the initial
non-cognitive skills more productive (i.e., @2✓NCt+1/@✓NCt @✓Ct > 0).
Figures 2.7c and 2.8c show that the production of cognitive skills relies heavily
on past levels of cognitive skills. Although the existing levels of non-cognitive skills
contribute in the production process of cognitive skills, their contribution is small
compared to that of the existing stock of cognitive skills. For instance, going from
decile 1 to decile 10 in non-cognitive skills distribution has the same effect on the
production of cognitive skills as increasing the cognitive skills input by one decile.
Figure 2.9c shows that, at age 14 (i.e., t = 1), the self-productivity of cognitive skills
is higher among non-cognitive skilled people. Analogously, Figure 2.9d shows that
the productivity of non-cognitive skills in producing next period cognitive skills is
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higher among kids with high initial cognitive skills.
My results indicate that there is a strong path dependence in which skills produce
skills, setting a high cost in terms of future stock of skills for those who start the
accumulation process in the lower quantiles of the skill distribution. My results
also show that this path dependence is not reversed by investment choices. In fact,
Table 2.8 and Figure 2.11 show that investment choices in non-cognitive skills depend
greatly on the past level of non-cognitive skills, and investment choices in cognitive
skills depend greatly on past levels of that skill in the first place. Hence, people with
high skills not only pass their high stock on to the next period, but also they are
more prone to invest in their development.
2.6.3.3 Effects of Bullying on Skill Production and Future Bullying
The right panel of Table 2.8 shows the effect of bullying on the accumulation of
cognitive and non-cognitive skills. To calculate this, I compare the next period skills
of those who would be selected into bullying with those who would not, evaluated
at the skills’ mean. That is, E
h




✓̂St+1|✓̄NCt , ✓̄Nt ,Mt+1 = 0
i
for S = {NC,C}. For age 14, I find there is a statistically significant effect of -0.0631
of bullying on next period non-cognitive skill accumulation. In order to put into
perspective this figure, note that the standard deviation of ✓NCt+1 is 0.4461. Therefore,
my results indicate that bulling reduces non-cognitive skill accumulation by 14.15%
of a standard deviation for the average kid. This is a very sizable effect. It implies
a reduction of 19.11% of a standard deviation in the language test score, and a
reduction of 16.41% of a standard deviation in the math test score. The differential
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































is presented in Figure 2.12a. It shows that this effect can be twice as big for youths
with low initial levels of non-cognitive skills.
The same estimation shows there is no statistically significant effect of bullying
on cognitive skill accumulation at that age. These results indicate that, as expected,
bullying is much more costly in the non-cognitive dimension than in the cognitive one.
Although victims might skip school, their learning ability is not affected as gravely as
their ability to self regulate, overcome obstacles, see themselves positively or relate
with others.
Due to the fact that skill levels are important determinants of future bullying, the
documented skill depletion caused by bullying is translated into higher probabilities
of being victimized again. My dynamic model allows me to see the difference in the
incidence of victimization conditional on past victimization. That is, I am able to
compare the probability of being bullied at t = 2 conditional on having being bullied
at t = 1. The results presented in Figures 2.13a and 2.13b indicate that, despite the
overall decrease of bullying incidence, previous victims are more likely to be bullied
at t = 2 than previous non-victims regardless of their skill levels. The probability of
being bullied at t = 2 of the previous non-victims is around one fourth less than that
of the one that were previously victimized.
The dynamic analysis for age 15 (i.e., t = 2) finds that bullying not only becomes
more selective, but also more costly. Its effect on the accumulation of non-cognitive
skills now reaches -0.3763 for the average student, which represents a reduction of
72.8% of a standard deviation of next period skills. This implies loosing around half
of a standard deviation in the language and math test scores. Figure 2.12b shows
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In particular, the stock of non-cognitive skills lost to bullying by the kids in the first
decile of the non-cognitive skill distribution is around 1.5 times greater than the loss
of those in the top decile of the distribution.
By age 15, and probably because bullying has became more selective, I do observe
statistically significant effect on cognitive skill accumulation. In fact, I estimate that
the average kid loses 35% of a standard deviation of next period cognitive skills.
This represents loosing 16.64% of a standard deviation in the language test, and
13.42% of a standard deviation in the math test. As in the case of non-cognitive
skill accumulation, the size of the effect depends on the skill levels at the beginning
of the period. Figure 2.12d shows that the kids that arrive to this age with low
cognitive skills feel the greatest impact of bullying on cognitive skill accumulation.
In particular, the cognitive unskilled might lose up to 70% of a standard deviation in
next period cognitive skills.
In sum, the average kid will score around two thirds of a standard deviation less
in the language and math tests by age 16 if bullied during the last year. These skill
loses can also be translated into sizable effect in terms of other outcomes besides test
scores.26 For instance, the average kid would be 28.6 percentage points more likely to
report being sick recently, 8.3 percentage points more likely to smoke and 15.8 more
likely to drink alcoholic beverages. The stock of skills lost also translates to setbacks
in mental health. They equate to an increase of 134.5% of a standard deviation in
the depression symptom scale, an increase of a full standard deviation in the levels
of stress cased by insecurities regarding his or her image, and 95% of a standard
deviation in the levels of stress caused by issues regarding school.
26 In Appendix M, I run models of unobserved heterogeneity at age 16 on several outcomes like
depression, stress in different situations, and the likelihood of smoking, drinking alcohol, felling
healthy, being satisfied with life and going to college by age 19.
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The full path for the average student. My model allows me to track all the process
triggered by bullying and in that way measure the gap that widens as time goes
by and new victimization events materialize. For instance, let us track the average






= (0, 0). V has a 22.5% chance of being bullied. If V is bullied, V will
lose 14.15% of a standard deviation of next period non-cognitive skills. V ’s cognitive
skills remain unchanged. The fact that V was bullied increases V ’s probability of
being bullied again by one fourth compared to the scenario when he was not bullied
in the first place. If V is bullied again, let us call this scenario V11, V would have
lost 91.65% and 38.47% of a standard deviation of non-cognitive and cognitive skills
respectively. If V is not bullied again but was bullied before, scenario V10, V ’s skill
loses would be of 17.23% of a standard deviation of non-cognitive skills and 2.8% of
a standard deviation of cognitive skills. If V was not bullied before but is bullied
now, scenario V01, V ’s losses would amount to 72.8% of a standard deviation in the
non-cognitive dimension and 35% of a standard deviation in the cognitive one. These
results compare to the situation V00 when V was never victimized, and therefore V ’s
set of skills remained at (0, 0).
Using the results presented in Appendix M to translate these gaps into more
understandable metrics, we see that for V11 they represent a 36 percentage points
increase in the probability of feeling sick, a 10.3 percentage points increase in the
likelihood of smoking, 19.8 percentage points increase in the likelihood of drinking
alcohol. They also represent an increase of 170% of a standard deviation in the
depression symptom scale, an increase of 133% of a standard deviation in the stress
due to image scale, and a 120% of a standard deviation increase in the stress caused
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by school.
Note that this exercise follows the average student. Therefore, around half of
students in the sample will face harsher consequences than the ones just described
due to the fact that they will start this middle-school journey with lower stocks of
skills.
2.6.3.4 Complementarities
As explained in Section 2.3, the analysis of the static and dynamic complementarities
between skills and bullying allows the measurement of how much the effect of the
shock on skill formation is modified by a marginal change in previous period skills,
and to what extent the effect of bullying is compounded on past bullying events.
My results regarding the static complementarity on bullying (i.e., equation (2.2)),
presented in Figures 2.14 and 2.15, show that marginal increases of the level of non-
cognitive skills drastically reduce the negative effect of bullying on non-cognitive skill
accumulation. In fact, comparing Figures 2.12a (i.e., the size of the effect on bullying
at age 14 on non-cognitive skill formation at age 15) and 2.14a we see that a marginal
increase in non-cognitive skills would have reduced the negative effect of bullying by
around one half. For the average kid, the raw effect of bullying on non-cognitive
skills at age 15 would be reduced from -0.0631, to -0.0368 by just a marginal increase
in the previous period non-cognitive skills. At age 16, the static complementarity
between bullying and non-cognitive skills represents around one third of the full effect
of bullying on non-cognitive skill formation. Therefore, marginal increases in the
previous period non-cognitive skills would have brought down the size of the bullying
effect for the average kid from -0.3763 to -0.2414. These sizable reductions contrast
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with the evidence presented in Figures 2.14b and 2.15b that demonstrate the negligible
influence that marginal increases of cognitive skills have on reducing the impact of
bullying on non-cognitive skill accumulation.
Regarding the effect bullying has at age 15 on cognitive skill accumulation, Figures
2.15c and 2.15d indicate that marginal increases in the stock of both cognitive and
non-cognitive skills lessen its negative effect.27 For the average kid, the effect of
bullying on cognitive skill production would fall by a third due to marginal increases
in previous period non-cognitive skills, and two thirds due to a marginal increase in
the previous period stock of cognitive skills.
The analysis on the dynamic complementarity of bullying on skill accumulation
(i.e., equation (2.3)), presented in Figure 2.16, shows that there is, in fact, a com-
pounded effect of bullying, especially for those with low non-cognitive skills. That is,
the negative effect of bullying at age 15 on skill accumulation at age 16 is greater if
the person was bullied at age 14. Hence, not only bullying becomes more selective on
low non-cognitive skilled people, as shown in Figures 2.6a and 2.6b, but also a second
bullying event itself is more harmful.
27 Figures 2.14c and 2.14d present the static complementarity analysis for cognitive skill accumu-
lation at age 14. They are presented for the sake of completeness. I will not thoroughly analyze


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































All the evidence presented in this Chapter argue in favor of the existence of a
self-reinforcing mechanism in which low skilled kids are more likely to be victims of
violence at their schools, and in turn not only their skills are depleted by the bullying
event itself, but also its consequences aggravated for those who started with low skill
levels in the first place. This send them in a downward spiral by making them even
more at risk of being victims of bullying in the future, which in turn will be much more
harmful events, and therefore having always more and more difficulties in acquiring
the non-cognitive skills they lack. Even though, I show that investment in non-
cognitive during middle school years is often unproductive, the static complementarity
results suggest that even a tiny bit of skill accumulation would have an immense
impact not only in deterring bullying, but also in lessening its consequences among
those that are more at risk.
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2.7 Policy Implications
Several anti-bullying campaigns have been deployed all around the world in an effort
ambitious effort to eliminate this unwanted phenomenon. Prominent psychologists
and governmental institutions are continuously involved in the development of pro-
grams to deter bullying.28 My findings indicate there are at least two fronts policy-
makers can work on. First, the development of non-cognitive skills. Non-cognitive
skilled kids will not only be more likely to be successful adults (Duckworth and Selig-
man, 2005; Heckman et al., 2006c), but also they are dramatically less likely to be
victimized. And if—despite the low probability of being so— they happen to be bul-
lied, its impact on their skill accumulation path is much lessened. The importance of
developing non-cognitive skills at a young age is heightened by the strong dependance
of current skill levels on past skills levels.
The second implication of my results relates with classroom assignment. Tables
2.6 and 2.7 show that, given the skill levels, children with uncommon characteristics
are more likely to be targeted by bullies. Therefore, in an effort to illustrate how
much would bullying be reduced if kids were less likely to be found in classroom
where some of their characteristics end up being uncommon, I simulate a different
type of classroom allocation. One that is unfeasible in practice and treated as a
benchmark, places all the kids in the survey in classroom with kids that have similar
stocks of non-cognitive skills. This exercise ignores geographical distances. It just
sorts the universe of students with respect to their non-cognitive skills and split them
in classrooms according to the typical classroom size in South Korea.
The results of these simulations are presented in Figure 2.17. As in Figure 2.6a,
28 See the Olweus Bullying Prevention Program and the US Education Department stopbully-
ing.gov program.
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it plots the likelihood of being bullied for every skill level. A comparison between
these two figures shows the massive impact that reducing in-classroom non-cognitive
skill heterogeneity has on the likelihood of being victimized. The benchmark case
presented in Figure 2.17 shows that by arranging students with classmates that have
similar levels of non-cognitive skills, the overall likelihood of victimization falls from
22.5% to 5.5%. This dramatic reduction is focused on medium and high non-cognitive
skilled students, for which the hazard of being bullied almost disappears. Although
proportionally less, there is also a substantial reduction of victimization among low
non-cognitive students. If placed in skill homogenous classrooms, low non-cognitive
skilled students would see their chances of being victimized drop by half.








































This chapter of the dissertation develops and estimates a structural model of skill
accumulation that explicitly introduces a peer-affected input. This way, I introduce
bullying as a skill depleter event into a model that is general enough to allow past
skills, parental investment choices and bullying to affect future stock of skills, and at
the same time investment choices and bullying to be affected by past skill levels. The
model uses several dimensions of unobserved heterogeneity and in-classroom variation
of student characteristics to identify the victims. My findings indicate the existence
of a vicious cycle between victimization and skill depletion. I find that bullying is
disproportionately suffered by students that lack socio-emotional skills, and among
those, the smart students are more likely to be victimized. My findings, in line
with psychological studies, suggest that conditional on the level of skills, kids with
uncommon characteristics relative to those of their classmates are more likely to be
victimized.
The dynamic estimation showed that bullying is very costly in terms of the amount
of skills lost from one period to the next. Bulling at age 14 reduces non-cognitive skill
accumulation by a 14.15% of a standard deviation for the average kid. That effect is
twice as big for kids with low initial levels of non-cognitive skills. At age 15, bullying
not only becomes more selective, but also more costly. It reduces next period skills by
almost three-fourths of a standard deviation. Static complementarity shows current
stock of non-cognitive skills—unlike the cognitive one—influences greatly the “nega-
tive productivity” of the bullying event. In the same vein, the analysis of dynamic
complementarity shows that the effect of being bullied at age 15 on the skills at age
16 is greater for those who were also bullied at age 14, especially those who started
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with low non-cognitive skills.
These results show the existence of a self-reinforcing mechanism, in which initial
levels of skill becomes crucial, suggesting that policies aimed to foster cognitive skills
at early ages will greatly reduce victimization occurrence. In addition, my model
indicates that the allocation of students in more homogeneous classroom might reduce
victimization by preventing kids with uncommon characteristics to be isolated and
targeted by bullies.
This Chapter intends to contribute to the human development literature in eco-
nomics with explanations of how victimization of school-aged kids may hamper the
development of successful adults. In this process, this Chapter contributed to the
skill formation literature by introducing latent factor dependent shocks as triggers of
phenomena that have long-lasting consequences. In this context, this Chapter opens
a promising research agenda that can continue in at least two ways. First, by ex-
tending my model to incorporate additional characteristics and dynamics regarding
bullying, and second, by analyzing the skill accumulation consequences of other types
of shocks. Among the latter, new research is needed to analyze the consequences
of shocks like parental separation or loss, and health or family financial mishaps.
Among the former, promising research opportunities arise in the analysis of the role
that gender plays in classroom dynamics vis-a-vis bullying, or—data permitting—the
introduction of physical traits as determinants of victimization. Furthermore, given
the importance of initial levels of skills, it is crucial to explore how bullying affects
skill accumulation among younger cohorts.
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3. WAGE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST HOMOSEXUALS, THE
ROLE OF SKILLS
3.1 Introduction
Labor market discrimination has been a popular topic in economics. In particular,
labor market discrimination against women and racial minorities has been under the
radar of labor economists for a long time (see for example, Becker, 1957; Mincer and
Polachek, 1974; Neal and Johnson, 1996; Urzua, 2008). Their findings have ignited
a number of anti-discriminatory policies around the world.1 However, much less is
known regarding labor market discrimination towards sexual minorities, despite the
increasing amount of public attention received by this population in recent years.2
Recent literature has tried to keep up with the public debate and has been able to
document the existence of a sexual minority wage gap. In particular, this literature
has shown that non-heterosexual men earn less than their heterosexual counterparts
by about 15–30 percent (Badgett, 1995; Black et al., 2003; Carpenter, 2007). Evi-
dence on women is less conclusive. While some studies like Badgett (1995) suggest
gay/bisexual women earn less than heterosexual ones, other studies like Berg and
Lien (2002), Black et al. (2003) and Antecol et al. (2007) suggest the opposite.
1 In the US only, laws prohibiting labor market discrimination based on race, religion, country of
birth, gender, age and mental disability have been passed (Clain and Leppel, 2001).
2 Recent years have seen an unprecedented push of the political agenda regarding the rights of
sexual minorities in terms of employment protection, marriage and adoption(Carpenter, 2009).
There are at least two major problems with the existing literature on sexual mi-
norities’ labor market discrimination. First, they do not deal with the fact that
schooling and occupational choices are endogenous and themselves possibly affected
by the sexual preferences as well.3 And second, the income gap might respond to un-
observables, namely skill differentials, not only in productivity terms but also in the
way people choose their schooling level or occupation. This Chapter overcomes these
two issues by using an empirical strategy that controls for unobserved skill differen-
tials, and based on them allows choices and labor market outcomes to be endogenous.
This is a significant improvement with respect to the existing literature, as schooling
and occupational decisions are often included in the analysis as controls either by
assuming they are exogenous variables (Badgett, 1995), or by completely ignoring
the endogeneity problem (Allegretto and Arthur, 2001; Black et al., 2003).4
Another problem that plagues this literature is the lack of appropriate data sets.
Papers on sexual-preference discrimination have relied mainly on two sources of data:
the General Social Survey (GSS) or the Census.5 Each has its own problems. On one
hand, the GSS provides a relatively detailed description of sexual preferences but has a
very reduced sample size. For instance, the sample used by Badgett (1995) comprises
only 34 non-heterosexual women and 47 non-heterosexual men. On the other hand,
the Census provides a greater sample size, but the definition of who belongs to a
sexual minority has important setbacks. The only way to do so is to identify people
3 In fact, Carpenter (2009) shows that college outcomes are different for non-heterosexual men,
and Allegretto and Arthur (2001) find that—cohabiting—homosexual males have significantly higher
levels of education than heterosexuals. In addition, Antecol et al. (2007) shows that this finding is
also true for—cohabiting—homosexual women.
4 Black et al. (2003) in fact discuss the endogeneity problem of occupational choice but ignores
the one related to education.
5 Carpenter (2007) uses the National Health and Nutrition Examination Surveys (NHANES III),
but faces the same problem as the papers that use the GSS.
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who cohabit with a person of the same gender (Clain and Leppel, 2001; Allegretto and
Arthur, 2001; Antecol et al., 2007). Therefore, those identified as non-heterosexuals
conform a selected sample that excludes people who have chosen to remain single.
The cultural and legal restrictions imposed to gay marriage give the grounds to claim
that the selection into marrying/cohabiting is very different for homosexuals than
for heterosexuals, and that it may rely heavily on unobservables that also affect
the schooling and occupational choices, and the wages earned. I overcome these
problems by using a novel longitudinal Norwegian data set that provides very detailed
information regarding sexual preferences, allows me to have an acceptable sample size,
and importantly, allows me to measure skills as a latent variable.6 This way, I do
not have to restrict the study to non-single homosexuals and I am able to avoid the
source of confoundedness that arise from such a selected sample.
Another important contribution of this Chapter is that it is able to inquire about
the extent to which the wage gaps observed respond to skill differences. Recent
literature has shown that skills are critical in determining educational and labor
market outcomes (Heckman et al., 2006a; Borghans et al., 2008; Espinoza et al.,
2014), but whether there is a skill gap between homosexuals and heterosexuals, and
whether that gap may explain the wage differential is unknown. A priori, there are
no reasons to believe such a skill gap may exist, especially in the cognitive dimension.
However, Chapter 2 in this dissertation finds that teasing or bullying have a significant
impact in reducing skills, especially the non-cognitive ones. Then, if members of
sexual minorities are more likely to be teased or bullied while young, they may face
adulthood with a diminished stock of skills.
6 For a detailed explanation of the data used to define the non-heterosexual groups see Section
3.2.1, and a more detailed explanation of the data in general see Section 3.3.
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Finally, this Chapter also addresses whether the income gap responds to differ-
ences in occupational tastes. That is, if non-heterosexual people are more likely to
choose lower-paying occupations, that choice may contribute in explaining the income
differences between gays and heterosexuals. Unlike Antecol et al. (2007) who explore
this issue—and find no evidence in its favor—under the assumption of occupational
choices being exogenous, I allow them to be endogenous in the context of a Roy Model
of potential outcomes based on observable and unobservable characteristics.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Discretizing the Definition of Homosexuality According to the Data
Section 3.3 shows that the Norwegian dataset used in this Chapter has a very rich
battery of questions regarding sexual orientation. However, regardless of the data
available, defining homosexuality is a difficult task. Homosexuality is not a dichoto-
mous indicator but a spectrum of preferences that go from being attracted or having
had sex with only women to being attracted or having had sex with only men, where
between of these two extremes there is a complex assortment of sexual preferences
(Laumann et al., 1994). Defining homosexuality according to the data becomes even
more complex as it can be drawn from three different concepts explored in Laumann
et al. (1994) and Badgett (1995). First, which gender generates sexual interest (i.e.,
sexually attracted to, sexual fantasies about) to the respondent. Second, whether
the respondent considers herself homosexual to a particular extent. And third, the
gender of the respondent’s sexual partners. In consequence, I build four types of di-
chotomous variables that split the sample between heterosexual and non-heterosexual
respondents. The first measure is constructed according to sexual interests (SI) and
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considers to be homosexual any individual that is attracted in any degree to peo-
ple of the same sex. The second measure is constructed according to self-perception
of homosexuality (SP) and considers as homosexual any individual that believes he
or she is homosexual in any degree. The third measure (SX) respond to whether a
person has had sex with someone from the same gender. And finally, the fourth mea-
sure widens the definition of the third measure to also include those that are mainly
attracted to people from the same gender, regardless of the gender of their sexual
partners (SX+).7
Tab. 3.1: Percentage of Homosexuals According to Each Definition
SI SP SX SX+
Observations 644 591 350 528
% of Population
Overall 22.0 20.2 11.9 18.0
Males 11.4 12.9 10.2 12.5
Females 30.7 26.1 13.3 22.4
Table 3.1 shows the proportion of respondents that are classified as homosexual
according to each definition. It shows that the SI and SP definitions are, as expected,
very similar to each other, while the definition that relies on actual sexual relations
is much more selective. Interestingly, for every definition women are more likely to
be classified as homosexuals, but the difference in the number of men and women
identifies as homosexual is drastically smaller in the SX definition than in the ones
that use self-perception or sexual interest.
7 This last definition intends to increase the sample size while still having a very restrictive target
of the population identified.
114
3.2.2 The Income Gap
The typical estimation found in the literature on income discrimination for sexual
minorities relies on a linear model for labor market outcomes of the form
lnY = ↵ +  Gay +  X+
SX
s=1
 sDs + " (3.1)
where Y is the income measure of interest, X is a set of observable controls (e.g.,
age, experience, geographical region), and Ds are dummy variables that represents
the schooling level where s = {0, . . . , S}.8 To capture differences between the effect
for lesbians from the effect of homosexual men, Model (3.1) is often augmented with
an interaction between Gay and gender, or the models are estimated separately for
each gender. In essence, the parameter of interest of these type of models is   which
the existing literature interprets as the difference in income between two individuals
that have the same observable characteristics and have achieved the same education
levels but differ in their sexual preferences.
However, the estimation of (3.1) requires substantial econometric considerations
(Urzua, 2008). The most important one is that unobservable characteristics may
influence simultaneously schooling or occupational decisions and income, and those
choices themselves can be influenced by the sexual preference of the individual.9 This
issue has completely being ignored by the literature on homosexual-heterosexual wage
gaps. Neal and Johnson (1996)—when exploring racial wage gaps—argue they can
bypass that endogeneity issue by referring to the skills accumulated after schooling
8 Berg and Lien (2002) use a multinomial logit because the income on the GSS data is coded in
ranges. The intuition and controls used remain the same as in (3.1)
9 Antecol et al. (2007) show that homosexuals are more likely to go to college and also that gay
males are less likely to be in male dominated occupations than heterosexual men, while lesbians are
more likely to do so than heterosexual women.
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is no longer mandatory instead of schooling or occupation per-se. For them, the
educational and occupational choices made during adulthood that end up affecting
income are mediated by the stock of skills—proxied by test scores—they had when
they started making those decisions. Hence, this approach claims that conditional
on the skill levels, the income gap is fixed across educational levels or occupational
sectors. As Urzua (2008) showed in the case of racial income gaps, I show that this
approach is not appropriate to describe the existing income gaps between homosex-
uals and heterosexuals. In fact, the size of these gaps differ across educational and
occupational choices.
Models like (3.1) also assume that  s does not differ across sexual preferences.
Although, we are not interested in the estimates of  s, this assumption does affects
the estimate of   because of the endogeneity issues just described.
My empirical strategy takes care of these issues. It not only incorporates unob-
served skill into the analysis of sexual preference related wage gaps, but also—based
on these unobservables—allows schooling and occupational choices and labor market
outcomes to be endogenous. It also allows homosexuals and heterosexuals to have
a different set of mincerian parameters, eliminating the troublesome assumption of
equal returns to observable characteristics and choices.
For comparison purposes, Table 3.2 presents the reduced form results of models of
the type described by equation (3.1) for each definition of homosexuality. Column 1
presents the unconditional difference in means. Norwegian homosexuals, on average,
earn between 11% and 15% less that heterosexuals. Adding age and gender controls
in column 2 reduce this gap to between 7.3% and 13.8% depending on the homosex-
uality definition. However, the specification that most resembles the one used in the
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existing literature is that of column 3 with the introduction of a dummy variable that
takes the value of 1 of the respondent had any kind of tertiary education. Also, it in-
corporates an interaction term between gay and female to identify a differential effect
on lesbians. The income gap in this specification ranges from 9% to 19% depending
on the homosexuality definition. However, for the most selective definitions the gap
is no longer statistically different from zero at the 90% confidence level.10 Compared
to the results found in the US labor market, the Norwegian results seem somewhat
small. This could respond to differences in the type samples used in the analyses or to
structural features in the Norwegian labor market vis-a-vis the US. Column 4 of Table
3.4 presents the estimation results of a model a la Neal and Johnson (1996). That is,
introducing test scores T as proxies of abilities instead of the schooling attainment:
lnY = ↵ +  Gay +  X+  T+ "
The results are very similar to those obtained with the college dummy instead of test
scores.
Interestingly, there seems to be no differential effect for lesbians as the interaction
term between Gay and female is never statistically different from zero. This is a very
relevant result that should be taken into account later on as the structural model I fit
in this Chapter is unable to disentangle differential effects for homosexuals depending
on their gender, due to sample size restrictions.
10 In fact, the coefficient for SX definition is statistically significant at the 85% confidence level.
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Tab. 3.2: Gap in Yearly Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Definition
SI -0.121*** -0.098** -0.189** -0.184**
(0.046) (0.046) (0.087) (0.091)
SI⇥female 0.131 0.126
(0.103) (0.107)
SP -0.136*** -0.095** -0.160* -0.163*
(0.048) (0.048) (0.083) (0.088)
SP⇥female 0.094 0.115
(0.107) (0.145)
SX -0.156*** -0.138** -0.126 -0.136
(0.058) (0.057) (0.088) (0.093)
SX⇥female -0.025 -0.008
(0.120) (0.120)
SX+ -0.112** -0.073* -0.092 -0.084
(0.049) (0.048) (0.082) (0.086)
SX+⇥female 0.016 0.045
(0.106) (0.106)
Age & gender X X X
College X
Test Scores X
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
All estimations were drawn from different regressions with the depen-
dent variable being the natural logarithm of yearly income among the
economically active population in wave four of the survey. Age en-
ters in a quadratic polynomial. The College variable takes the value
of 1 when the person has undertaken any kind of tertiary education in
colleges (høyskole) or universities (universitetet). This includes three-
year, four-year college studies or studies in the university with the same
length. The estimations with test scores include six scores, one related
to school grades (Math, Norwegian and English), two of them relate to
agreeableness and the ease to make friends, the others relate to pos-
itivism, leadership and scholastic competence. All of them collected
in the first wave of the survey. Estimations including college and test
scores we also calculated with no different results form those of column
(3) or (4).
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3.2.3 Access to Tertiary Education
Norway has a relatively high tertiary education enrollment rate; around 62% of people
go to a tertiary education institution of some sort. A vast literature on returns
to schooling has shown that differences in access to tertiary education is critical in
determining difference in earned income (Mincer, 1958; Becker and Chiswick, 1966;
Card, 2001). Therefore, part of the sexual preference income gap could be explained
by differences between homosexuals and heterosexuals in enrollment rates in tertiary
education. However, the reduced-form estimations presented in Table 3.3 show that
there is no systematic evidence of either group being more likely to go to a tertiary
education institution.11 If anything, these results suggest that lesbians tend to go
less to college than heterosexual women. Interestingly, when statistically different
from zero, the negative effect on lesbians counters the positive effect on women—not
presented in the table. Hence, the probability lesbians of going to tertiary education
is the same as that of homosexual and heterosexual men.
11 These findings oppose results on US data that suggests that homosexuals are more likely to
reach college education (Carpenter, 2009).
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Tab. 3.3: Gap in College Attendance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Definition
SI 0.068*** 0.032 0.041 0.024
(0.025) (0.025) (0.048) (0.048)
SI⇥female -0.013 0.001
(0.056) (0.056)
SP -0.008 -0.028 0.039 0.023
(0.026) (0.026) (0.046) (0.046)
SP⇥female -0.099* -0.051
(0.055) (0.055)
SX -0.016 -0.016 0.067 0.072
(0.032) (0.031) (0.049) (0.049)
SX⇥female -0.137** -0.139**
(0.063) (0.063)
SX+ -0.083*** -0.094*** 0.018 0.025
(0.027) (0.026) (0.045) (0.045)
SX+⇥female -0.169*** -0.150***
(0.056) (0.055)
Age & gender X X X
Test Scores X
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The College variable takes the value of 1 when the person has undertaken
any kind of tertiary education in colleges (høyskole) or universities (uni-
versitetet). This includes three-year, four-year college studies or studies in
the university with the same length. Age enters in a quadratic polynomial.
The estimations with test scores include six scores, one related to school
grades (Math, Norwegian and English), two of them relate to agreeableness
and the ease to make friends, the others relate to positivism, leadership and
scholastic competence. All of them collected in the first wave of the survey.
Sample comprises the economically active by wave 4 to be comparable to
structural model results.
3.2.4 Occupation
Occupational sorting is another important determinant of wages. There are occupa-
tions that inherently pay on average more than others. Then, inquiring if homosexuals
tend to prefer low paying occupations more than their heterosexual counterparts is
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key in addressing income discrimination. In fact, there is evidence of occupational
sorting among sexual minorities. Antecol et al. (2007) find evidence for the US that
suggest that gay males are less likely to be in male dominated occupations, while
lesbians are more likely to do so. However, according to Antecol et al. (2007), this
particular kind of sorting has no role in explaining the income gap.
The reduced form results presented in Table 3.4 provide evidence in favor of the
hypothesis that Norwegian homosexuals—especially those of the broader definitions—
prefer blue collar over white collar occupations, and as blue collar occupations pay
on average less, this could explain part of the income gaps observed.
3.3 Data
This Chapter of the dissertation uses a novel data set that has not been explored
by the economic literature. The Young in Norway (YiN) is a longitudinal data set
product of a research project headed by the Program for Adolescent Research (Ung-
forsk) in 1990.12 YiN is an amazing effort to collect detailed information about the
characteristics, attitudes and choices of a cohort of Norwegians. In particular, it has
four features that makes it the best data set available to study sexual minority income
discrimination. First it is longitudinal, therefore I am able to observe respondents’
characteristics when young. This improves over existing literature that explores in-
come gaps of sexual minorities using non-longitudinal surveys, which in turn prevents
researchers from differentiating away time-invariant unobservables that might bias
12 The project had four main goals. First, it was designed to produce studies of the entire pop-
ulation, not just specific groups. For that, the study’s design needed to have a high response rate
and national representativity. Second, the study wanted to provide researchers tools to find causal
relations. Finally, the study had to be comprehensive enough to be able to provide information of












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the results. Second, it collects scores on personality traits and academic performance
while kids. I use these measures to identify the unobserved skills, a key feature of my
empirical strategy. Third, it collects detailed information about sexual preferences
and practices. This way I do not run into absurdly small sample sizes and I am able
to include single people in the analysis. And fourth, it collects information about the
job market including ISCO88 coded occupations and yearly income.
YiN has four waves of data. The first wave was collected in 1992, when 12,287
students of lower and upper secondary school pupils, from 67 schools in grades 7-12
(age 12-20) were interviewed. The sampling allowed for each grade to be represented
equally, and the sampling unit was the school. Wave 2 was collected two years later
interviewing 7,637 youngsters. Some of the respondents answered the questionnaire
in school and others answered it through mail. The study was originally planned to
end after wave 2. However, a spin-off of the study continued in 1999 but only for those
who had answered the wave 2 questionnaire in school and not by mail. 2,923 people
were interviewed. Wave 4 was collected between May 2005 and August 2006. As in
wave 3, the intended population to be interviewed were those who had answered the
wave 2 questionnaire in school and not by mail. In this wave, data for 2,890 people
were collected. There is a great overlap between those wave 3 and wave 4 respondents,
in total 2,562 responded both surveys.
Following advise from the experts at NOVA, the agency responsible of the data, I
do not include in my analysis respondents that were not followed-up in waves 3 or 4.
This leaves a final sample of 2,991. According to Wichstrøm et al. (2013) those who
attrited were more likely to be younger males with low parental SES, all of which are
observables I can control for at every stage of the estimation.
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3.3.1 Skills
The empirical strategy used in this Chapter—and presented in Section 3.4—relies on
the identification of unobserved skills. Such identification and the subsequent esti-
mations based on this unobserved heterogeneity pose heavy requirements regarding
the minimum sample size. This minimum required increases geometrically with the
number of unobserved dimensions of skill to be estimated. Given that the sample
size of homosexuals in every definition is not large, I estimate the models with one
unobserved factor. This factor will comprise both cognitive and non-cognitive skills
in one construct.
To identify the unobserved skills factor, I use six scores; all of them collected in
the first wave of the survey, when the respondents were in their early to mid teens.
First, two of the measures relate to agreeableness, one in the area of social acceptance,
and another one measuring how easy is for the respondent to build close friendships.
The third measure relates to self-esteem. The fourth score relies on a scale that
measures qualities like leadership and strong-mindedness. The fifth scale uses school
grades in Math, Norwegian and English. Finally the sixth score measures scholastic
competence.
3.3.2 Income Measures
The YiN data set does not contain a measure of hourly wage, instead it asks about
pre-tax personal yearly income. Given that I am interested in discrimination in the
work place, I want to focus on samples whose economic activity ensures that most of
their income comes from their work. Namely, those who are employed (“Employed”,
1961 observations), and those who report being employed full time (“Full Time”, 1529
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observations).13 This way, I exclude inactive or unemployed population whose income
may come from rehabilitation, disability or unemployment benefits.14
3.4 Empirical Strategy
The empirical strategy used in this Chapter corresponds to the one explained in detail
in Section 1.5. Here, I will provide a short summary.
3.4.1 The Difference Between Scores and Skills
Works like Murnane et al. (1995); Heckman et al. (2006a); Espinoza et al. (2014) have
shown that skills are relevant determinants of life choices and adult outcomes, like
schooling, earnings and health, just as other characteristics like gender or household
composition. Hence, the outcomes Y we are interested in (e.g., ln wage, schooling)
are a result of observable characteristics XY (e.g., gender, tenure, local labor market)
and skills ✓. That is,
Y = XY  
Y + ↵Y ✓ + eY (3.2)
where Y is a M⇥1 vector of outcome variables, XY is a matrix with all observable
controls for each outcome variable, and eY ? (✓,XY) is a vector of error terms
13 This sample selection, needed to be able address wage discrimination, could be troublesome as
the observations left out of the sample may have characteristics that could influence in the final
results. However, and to the advantage of the present work, if anything, the effect of the bias would
make me results about a lower bound. That is because homosexuals are between 3 and 9 percentage
points less likely to be employed (i.e., appear in the selected sample). Hence, if the unobservables
that make a person participate in the labor force are positively correlated with income, then the
homosexuals I get in the sample would have “better” unobservables than the ones left out, which
would cause the estimated mean incomes of homosexuals to be slightly more than what the latent
income is. Therefore, the estimated income gaps against homosexual would be smaller than if I had
an uncensored sample.
14 An important stylized fact is that homosexuals are equally likely to receive social benefits as
heterosexuals are, regardless of the definition of homosexuality. Therefore, there is no reason to
believe that any leakage in the income measures constructed could bias the results in either direction.
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with distributions feym (·) such that eyi ? eyj for every m = 1, . . . ,M . However, a
difficulty arises in estimating equation (3.2): skills are not well defined entities with
established scales or units of measurement. Instead they are latent variables that need
to be inferred from variation captured in manifest variables they affect (Bartholomew
et al., 2011). Hence, these manifest variables are assumed to be the result of a linear
production function of test scores whose inputs are both observable characteristics
and skills of the form:
T = XT 
T + ↵T✓ + eT (3.3)
where T is a L⇥ 1 vector of measurements (e.g., test scores), XT is a matrix with
all observable controls that affect each score, and eT ? (✓,XT ) is a L ⇥ 1 vector of
mutually independent error terms that have associated distributions feh (·) for every
h = 1, . . . , L. Being the skills latent, the best we can do as econometricians is to infer
their underlying distribution f✓ (·). That is the purpose of measurement system (3.3):
use variation observed in the manifest variables to identify the distributional param-
eters of the unobserved factor (Kotlarski, 1967).15 This facilitates the estimation the
complete structural model because such distributions allow us to integrate away the
unobservable variation of skill endowments in all the outcomes, choices and scores
associated with the model, while still being able to retrieve the coefficients related
with the skills in every equation.
The complete structure of the model, including the parameters that describe the
distributions of the underlying factor f✓ (·), is estimated using maximum likelihood
15 See full set of restrictions needed for identification of the loadings and the diagonal matrix of
the variances of the factors ⌃✓ in Section 1.5
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fey1 (XY1 , Y1, ⇣)⇥ · · ·⇥ feyM (XYM , YM , ⇣)
⇥fe1 (XT1 , T1, ⇣)⇥ · · ·⇥ feL (XTL , TL, ⇣)
3
775 dF✓ (⇣) (3.4)
3.4.2 Roy Model: Allowing for Endogenous Choice
A model of potential outcomes inspired by the Roy model (Roy, 1951; Willis and
Rosen, 1979) can easily be seen as a especial case of the setup presented above in
subsection 3.4.1. For that, suppose M = 3 in the dimensions of vector Y in (3.2),
where one row contains a binary choice D (e.g., going to college or not) and the other
two contain the outcomes of interest that depend on such choice (e.g., wage for those


























where [A] denotes an indicator function that takes a value of 1 if A is true, and
XD represents a set of exogenous observables that affect the choice. In order for the
model not to rely on its non-linearity for coefficient identification XD needs to have a
source of variation that is not present in XY and that affects Y1 and Y0 only through
D.
An important feature of the Roy Model is that individuals must choose between
16 As in the case of Chapter 1, I use the heterofactor command for Stata to perform the structural
estimations presented in this Chapter (Sarzosa and Urzua, 2012).
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two sectors, for example, treated and not treated. Therefore, both the decision and
the outcomes are endogenous based on observable and unobservable characteristics of
the individuals. This feature is key in the development of counterfactuals in Section
3.5.6. This empirical strategy is able to disentangle all the endogenous variables
because it assumes that after controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity ✓, the
remaining error terms are independent (i.e., eD ? eY1 ? eY0), and can be modeled







fD (XD, YD, ⇣) feY0 (XY , Y0, ⇣)
1 D feY1 (XY , Y1, ⇣)
D
fe1 (XT1 , T1, ⇣) fe2 (XT2 , T2, ⇣)⇥ · · ·⇥ feL (XTL , TL, ⇣)
3
775 dF✓ (⇣) (3.6)
3.5 Results
This Section presents the main results of the Chapter of the dissertation. It is divided
into several parts. First, I present the results of a structural model in which the
unobserved skills are not estimated separately for homosexuals and heterosexuals.
Instead, I estimate a national distribution of skills and capture the sexual minorities’
income gap using dummy variables for homosexuals. This is the closest specification
to that of the reduced-form results of the existing literature. Then, I move onto
introduce this analysis into Roy models of potential outcomes. In the second part of
this Section, I estimate separate skill distributions for homosexuals and heterosexuals
and use them to estimate separate models. Then, I use simulations to show the
existence and main drivers of the income gaps.
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3.5.1 General Distribution of Skills: Income Gap Controlling for Unobservables
Let me first introduce the unobserved skills in a labor market outcome model similar
to those of the existing literature. The idea is to expand the reduced-form results to
incorporate unobserved heterogeneity. Hence the equation I estimate is
lnY = ↵ +  Gay +  X+  ✓ + "
where ✓ is the unobserved skills that are drawn from a general distribution esti-
mated using the complete sample. Like with the reduced-form results, I am interested
in the estimates of  . These are presented in Table 3.5 for each definition of homo-
sexuality and each measure of yearly income. These results are similar to the reduced
form ones from Table 3.2. They show evidence of income discrimination against
homosexuals of about 10%, especially among the wider definitions of homosexuality.
Tab. 3.5: Ln Annual Income Gap Controlling for Skills
SI SP SX SX+
Employed -0.113** -0.107** -0.057 -0.044
(0.049) (0.051) (0.059) (0.052)
Full Time -0.107** -0.097** -0.058 -0.029
(0.045) (0.047) (0.056) (0.048)
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. All estimations were drawn from different structural
estimations of income. The controls used and not presented
in the Table are: Age, Age squared, gender, dummies for Fa-
ther SES, population of the municipality and the unobservable
factor of skills.
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3.5.2 General Distribution of Skills: Roy Models
As explained above, in this subsection I introduce the unobserved heterogeneity and
the Roy model of potential outcomes in a context where one general distribution of



























where ✓ comes from a distribution estimated using the complete sample. In this case,
the parameters of interest are  D,  Y0 and  Y1 . The advantage of this kind of models is
that I am able to see differential effects of homosexuality depending whether D = 1 or
D = 0, and allow the occupational and schooling choices to depend on characteristics
of the respondent. I estimate two of these models that differ on the choice D made
by the individual. In one model, I analyze the endogenous choice of schooling level.
With it, I am able to inquire if there are different levels of discrimination depending
on the schooling level. In the other one, I analyze the occupational choice. In this
case I am able to see if there is a different type of discrimination agains homosexuals
among white collar or blue collar occupations.
Table 3.6 presents the results of the Roy model of potential outcomes where the
endogenous choice is tertiary education. The results show that, when controlling
for skills, homosexuals are less likely to go to college, especially according to the
narrowest definitions of homosexuality. Table 3.6 also shows that once in the labor
market, homosexuals that undertook tertiary education face a significant wage gap,
unlike those that did not go to college, who do not face any income gaps of their own.
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The gaps faced by the college educated homosexuals range between 9% and 13% for
those employed, and between 13% and 15% for those in full time jobs.
Table 3.7 on the other hand presents the results for a Roy model where the endoge-
nous choice is whether to be a white collar or a blue collar worker. In congruence with
the initial results of Table 3.4, the first row of Table 3.7 shows that after controlling
for skills homosexuals tend to prefer blue collar occupations over white collar occu-
pations. Interestingly, income discrimination against them is more pervasive in the
former than in the latter. In fact, the income gap ranges from 8% to 24%, depending
on the definition of homosexuality and yearly income used.
The results of Tables 3.6 and 3.7 attest to the importance of a model that allows for
endogenous choices and separate estimates for two different sectors. This way, I find
particular sectors where discriminations is stronger, namely among higher educated
and among blue-collar occupations.
3.5.3 Separate Distributions: Unobserved Abilities
The main drawback of the empirical strategy used above is that it restricts the esti-
mates of the model to be the same for homosexuals and heterosexuals. If there are
any differences in the skill distributions, or in the labor market returns to observable
and unobservable characteristics, the results presented above could be misleading.
Therefore, from this point on, I present the results of models that allow to estimate
a complete set of different parameters for heterosexuals and homosexuals, including
the skills’ distributions.
Figures 3.1 presents the estimated skill distributions for heterosexuals and ho-








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































assuming normality and instead empirically estimating the distributions pays off as
they are far from normally distributed, especially the ones from homosexuals. Fig-
ures 3.1 show that skills among homosexuals are more tightly distributed. While the
standard deviation of skills among heterosexuals is around 0.33, it is between 0.12
to 0.22 for homosexuals. This interesting difference in the distribution of unobserved
skills may have important consequences on schooling and occupational sorting and
also in the income obtained when adults.
By construction, all the estimated distributions of unobserved ability are centered
at zero.17 However, Urzua (2008) showed that with a minor linearity assumption, one
can use the difference between the estimated constants of the test score equations
that contain the nummeraire loadings to infer the difference in means of the skill
distributions of two groups. Figures 3.1 are depicted in a way such that the centers of
the skills distributions of homosexuals are shifted to represent the difference in means
with respect to those of heterosexuals. Importantly, none of these differences in the
means of skill distributions between homosexuals and heterosexuals are statistically
significant.
17 In general, to estimate the adjunct measurement system (3.3), the empirical strategy uses Q
normals that will be combined using weights !q. Abusing notation, the estimated distribution
f✓ (·) =
PQ
q=1 !qN (µq, q), where
PQ
q=1 !q = 1. Hence, the weight of the last normal needs to fulfill
!Q = 1  
PQ 1
q=1 !q. In the same way, given that all equations contain intercepts, the mean of the
last normal µQ is one such that
PQ






Fig. 3.1: Distribution of Unobserved Abilities by Sexual Preference
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3.5.4 Effect of Skills on Outcomes
With different estimated distributions of skills for every population group, I am able
to estimate different models of potential outcomes and endogenous choices for each
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where the parameters labeled with S correspond to heterosexuals and the ones la-
beled with G correspond to homosexuals. Tables 3.8 and 3.9 present the standardized
estimates of the sexual preference-specific coefficients associated with skills for in-
come, tertiary education and occupation.18 Table 3.8 shows that skills are important
determinants of sorting into tertiary education regardless of the sexual orientation.
However, the results also show that the returns to skills do differ between heterosex-
uals and homosexuals, supporting the use of a model that allows different parameters
across sexual preferences. Interestingly, among heterosexuals, skills have significant
positive returns only for those that undertook some sort of tertiary education. On the
other hand, among homosexuals, skills are rewarded independently of the level of edu-
cation attained. However, skills are rewarded more among those who went to tertiary
education than among those who did not. The numbers in Table 3.8 also indicate
that skills have stronger effects on income for homosexuals than for heterosexuals. In
particular, while a one standard deviation increase in skills among college educated
18 All the tables in this Subsection lack results for the SX definition of homosexuality because the
models like (3.7) did not converge, due to insufficient sample size.
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heterosexuals causes yearly income to increase about 10% to 25%, the yearly income
increase due to a one standard deviation increase in skills among college educated
homosexuals rages between 45% and 75%.
Table 3.9, in turn, shows that even though skills impact positively the likelihood
of choosing a white collar occupation, in general blue collar occupations reward more
those skills in terms of annual income. The numbers do not allow to specify whether
skills are rewarded more in general among homosexuals or heterosexuals. None of
the groups have an overall advantage over the other. However, there are specific
definitions, like SI, where there seems to be a higher reward for skills among blue
collar homosexuals than among heterosexuals in the same occupations.
137
Tab. 3.8: Standardized Loadings: ln Annual Income and Tertiary Education Choice
Heterosexuals Homosexuals
SI SP SX+ SI SP SX+
College 0.796*** 0.811*** 1.022*** 0.349*** 0.074 0.152*
(0.19) (0.157) (0.191) (0.082) (0.11) (0.087)
Employed
No College 0.051 0.041 0.053 0.454*** 0.395*** 0.347***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.05) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007)
College 0.099* 0.065 0.160*** 0.499*** 0.617*** 0.635***
(0.052) (0.049) (0.058) (0.031) (0.046) (0.014)
Full Time
No College 0.023 0.024 0.026 0.403*** 0.326*** 0.275**
(0.034) (0.038) (0.04) (0.009) (0.038) (0.115)
College 0.07 0.045 0.045 0.524*** 0.752*** 0.454***
(0.063) (0.058) (0.058) (0.016) (0.023) (0.035)
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parenthesis. The coefficients presented
are the estimates of the effect of the unobserved factor on each equation of model (3.7). Models are
estimates allowing for different distributions of the unobserved factor depending on sexual preference.
The College variable takes the value of 1 when the person has undertaken any kind of tertiary
education in colleges (høyskole) or universities (universitetet). This includes three-year, four-year
college studies or studies in the university with the same length. The observable controls used in
the College choice equation are: age, age squared, gender, dummies for father’s education, dummies
for mother’s education, whether as a child the person lived with one parent, a remarried parent
or with no parents, number of books available at home as a child. The observable controls used
in the income equations are age, age squared, gender, dummies for Father SES, population of the
municipality, height and the unobservable factor of skills.
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Tab. 3.9: Loadings: ln Annual Income and Occupational Choice
Heterosexuals Homosexuals
SI SP SX+ SI SP SX+
White Collar 0.871*** 0.752*** 0.845*** 1.546 2.355* 1.834
(0.148) (0.129) (0.146) (1.637) (1.338) (2.198)
Employed
Blue Collar 0.091** 0.029 0.056 0.584*** 0.453*** 0.433***
(0.045) (0.037) (0.047) (0.024) (0.054) (0.035)
White Collar 0.006 -0.004 0.018 0.042 0.166 0.391*
(0.05) (0.049) (0.05) (0.194) (0.171) (0.206)
Full Time
Blue Collar 0.033 0.053 0.041 0.01 0.027 -0.023
(0.028) (0.047) (0.047) (0.215) (0.133) (0.086)
White Collar -0.031 -0.023 0.006 0.163 0.211 0.533**
(0.05) (0.054) (0.056) (0.142) (0.212) (0.216)
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parenthesis. The coefficients presented
are the estimates of the effect of the unobserved factor on each equation of model (3.7). Models are
estimates allowing for different distributions of the unobserved factor depending on sexual preference.
The White-collar variable takes the value of 1 if person’s occupation is coded between 1 and 4 by
the one-digit ISCO88 codes, and zero otherwise. The observable controls used in the occupation
choice equation are: age, age squared, gender, dummies for father’s education, dummies for mother’s
education, whether as a child the person lived with one parent, a remarried parent or with no parents,
number of books available at home as a child. The observable controls used in the income equations
are age, age squared, gender, dummies for Father SES, population of the municipality, height and
the unobservable factor of skills.
3.5.5 Goodness of Fit of the Model
Tables 3.10 and 3.11 present evidence on the models’ goodness-of-fit for (ln) annual
income for each education level and occupational choice, respectively. The models do
very well in predicting the means for each definition of income and homosexuality.
The performance of the models predicting (ln) income for homosexuals is remarkably
good considering the reduced sample size the models are facing.
Table 3.12 shows the models’ goodness-of-fit for replicating the endogenous choices
made by the respondents, namely college going and whether to be a white collar or a
blue collar worker. Again, a comparison between the predicted means and the actual
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data shows that the models do very well in both choices and for every definition of
homosexuality.
These results show that the models predict very well the labor market outcomes
and choices for both homosexuals and heterosexuals. This provides confidence about
the fact that the model will produce appropriate counterfactuals to successfully ana-
lyze inequality in the labor market due to sexual preferences.
Tab. 3.10: Goodness of Fit - Ln Annual Income by Schooling level and Sexual Preference
Heterosexual Homosexual
SI SP SX+ SI SP SX+
lnIncome if Employed
No College
Actual 5.556 5.558 5.563 5.442 5.453 5.446
Model 5.554 5.562 5.555 5.407 5.461 5.464
College
Actual 5.514 5.525 5.512 5.432 5.354 5.398
Model 5.484 5.518 5.474 5.428 5.316 5.315
lnIncome if Full Time
No College
Actual 5.669 5.655 5.661 5.536 5.597 5.571
Model 5.64 5.625 5.634 5.529 5.542 5.539
College
Actual 5.575 5.583 5.581 5.483 5.414 5.539
Model 5.571 5.578 5.573 5.491 5.322 5.503
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Tab. 3.11: Goodness of Fit - Ln Annual Income by Occupational Choice and Sexual Pref-
erence
Heterosexual Homosexual
SI SP SX+ SI SP SX+
lnIncome if Employed
Blue Collar
Actual 5.451 5.449 5.429 5.205 5.212 5.319
Model 5.448 5.441 5.425 5.193 5.227 5.356
White Collar
Actual 5.612 5.596 5.596 5.537 5.522 5.511
Model 5.631 5.619 5.616 5.551 5.526 5.512
lnIncome if Full Time
Blue Collar
Actual 5.613 5.577 5.567 5.329 5.397 5.448
Model 5.585 5.536 5.525 5.33 5.385 5.442
White Collar
Actual 5.646 5.633 5.627 5.601 5.505 5.536
Model 5.662 5.655 5.646 5.605 5.509 5.531
Tab. 3.12: Goodness of Fit - Schooling level and Occupation by Sexual Preference
Heterosexual Homosexual
SI SP SX+ SI SP SX+
Prob. College Going
Actual 0.627 0.641 0.655 0.705 0.644 0.570
Model 0.633 0.641 0.655 0.691 0.636 0.561
Prob. White Collar
Actual 0.598 0.607 0.614 0.612 0.564 0.526
Model 0.598 0.606 0.611 0.595 0.551 0.525
3.5.6 Gaps in Labor Market Outcomes
From the results I have provided so far, it is possible to argue three facts. First,
that unobserved skills are important determinants of education choices, occupational
choices and income earned. Second, that the way these skills affect those adult out-
comes depends on the sexual preference of the individual. And third, that skills follow
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different distributions for homosexuals and heterosexuals. Hence, based on these three
facts, one could hypothesize that the income gaps observed could respond to these
estimated difference in skill distributions, and that the amount of the gap that is not
explained by such differences—or differences in observable characteristics—could be
attributed to plain discrimination.
Urzua (2008) showed that one can use the structure of the model to evaluate these
claims. In particular, it is possible to use the model to simulate the outcomes that
homosexuals would have obtained if their skills came from the heterosexual skills’
distribution and/or if they had the observable characteristics homosexuals have.19






























be the (ln) income given by observable characteristics XHXY and X
HX
D and unobservable
skills ✓H✓ . The supra-index denotes the sexual preference group (i.e., H⇧ = {S,G}).















. These are the values presented
in Tables 3.10 and 3.11. I can use this notation to identify the simulation of coun-







denotes the simulated income earned by
homosexuals when given skills drawn from the heterosexuals’ skills distributions but
keeping the observable characteristics as they are. Consequently, the simulated in-
come earned by homosexuals when given the skills and observable characteristics of
19 See the differences in observable characteristics across groups in Table N.1 in the Appendix
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are endogenous is an important feature of
the models, that affects the simulation of counterfactuals. That is, when counterfac-
tuals are simulated, their new results are product not only of direct changes in the










, but also of indirect changes
through the schooling or occupational decision. Hence, for instance, when simulat-
ing the model for homosexuals but giving them skills drawn from the heterosexuals’s





. This materializes the very important
fact that education and occupational decisions are taken based on observable and
unobservable characteristics, and once these change, people might choose differently.
Hence, the measure of the total income gaps between the two groups need to incor-
porate the differences that arise from both the direct and indirect channels. That is,































































































































) are important in determining
the overall income gap because they mediate the way income differences between
homosexuals and heterosexuals for each level of education or occupational choice
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enter in the overall gap calculation.
Tables 3.13 and 3.15 present the results using several counterfactual simulations
on the different definitions of yearly income and homosexuality, and Tables 3.14 and
3.16 present the results for the proportion of people taking-up tertiary education and
white collar occupations respectively. In Tables 3.13 and 3.15, panels A and B present
the results for homosexuals and heterosexuals with their own characteristics.20 The
following two panels present the calculated income gaps described by (3.8). The
difference between the two panels is that in the one labeled Gap (Equalizing Gender)
the simulations correct for the fact that there are more women than men defined as
homosexuals (see Table 3.1) and if women earn consistently less than men, the gaps
I calculate could be confounding the effect of belonging to a sexual minority with
the effect of being a woman. By equalizing the gender distributions across groups, I
prevent gender discrimination biasing the comparisons. Panels C present the results
that arise after changes in skill distributions (i.e., Panel C1), observables (i.e., Panel
C2), and both skills and observables (i.e., Panel C3).21
3.5.6.1 Model With Education Choice
Tables 3.13 and 3.14 present the simulated counterfactual results for the models with
education choice. Before going into the analysis of the income gaps against homo-
sexuals, let me first show an important feature of the Norwegian labor market: the
fact that people with tertiary education do not earn more—on average—than people
without this level of education. This can be seen by comparing the simulated incomes
across educational choices. For instance, among employed heterosexuals people that
20 Notice that the figures presented there are the same as the one presented in Table 3.10 and 3.11.
21 Results in presented in Panel C1 also correct for gender disparities in definition of homosexuals.
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did not undertake tertiary education earn around 7% more than college educated
workers. This can be due to the strength of Norwegian practical training, or the fact
that the people in the sample are still in their late 20s and tertiary education might
become more valuable later in life.22 The explanation of this phenomenon is not of
interest for this work, but this feature of the Norwegian labor market it is key in
explaining some of the results below, especially because I am endogenizing schooling
choices and sorting into schooling may play a crucial role in explaining the income
gaps against sexual minorities.
Panels B1 and B2 of the Table 3.13 present the income gaps for each sample
and homosexuality definition without and with homogenized gender proportions, re-
spectively. Notice that homogenizing gender proportions in general reduce the point
estimates of the overall gap, although by a very small margin. The biggest changes af-
ter this correction are seen not in the overall gaps, but in the composition of the gaps
for SI and SP homosexuals. The correction reduces the gaps estimated for those that
did not go to college, while it increases them among those that did. These recompo-
sition of the gaps respond to the fact that there is a different sorting into schooling,
as can be seen in Table 3.14. The confounding effect that gender differences have
misleadingly increase the difference in take-up of tertiary education between hetero-
sexuals and homosexuals, which in turn affects the composition of the gaps between
the ones faced by those that go to college and the ones face by those that did not.
22 Figure N.1 in the Appendix shows that even though there is an income difference against the
younger college educated workers that disappears after they are 27 years of age, the rate of growth
of income of the college educated flattens and equalizes that of the non-college educated after they
are 28. Hence, there is evidence against the hypothesis that college may be rewarded more among
older workers.
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Tab. 3.13: Heterosexual and Homosexual ln Annual Income Under Different Assumptions
No College College Overall
SI SP SX+ SI SP SX+ SI SP SX+
A. Outcomes Heterosexuals
Employed 5.554 5.562 5.555 5.484 5.518 5.474 5.51 5.534 5.502
Full Time 5.64 5.625 5.634 5.571 5.578 5.573 5.596 5.595 5.594
B1. Outcomes Homosexuals
Employed 5.407 5.461 5.464 5.428 5.316 5.315 5.422 5.367 5.378
Full Time 5.529 5.542 5.539 5.491 5.322 5.503 5.502 5.4 5.519
Gap
Employed 0.465 0.059 -0.419 -0.377 0.108 0.542 0.088 0.167 0.124
Full Time 0.433 0.01 -0.464 -0.339 0.184 0.539 0.094 0.195 0.075
B2. Outcomes Homosexuals (Equalizing Gender)
Employed 5.437 5.511 5.535 5.42 5.31 5.333 5.426 5.384 5.418
Full Time 5.619 5.588 5.589 5.459 5.366 5.512 5.512 5.451 5.545
Gap (Equalizing Gender)
Employed 0.279 -0.05 -0.433 -0.195 0.2 0.517 0.084 0.15 0.084
Full Time 0.169 -0.165 -0.51 -0.086 0.308 0.559 0.084 0.144 0.049
C1. Outcomes Homosexuals with Heterosexuals Unobservables
Employed
Income 5.05 5.432 5.384 5.662 5.393 5.55 5.466 5.407 5.481
Gap 0.41 0.038 -0.34 -0.365 0.089 0.361 0.044 0.127 0.021
Full Time
Income 5.522 5.557 5.526 5.535 5.415 5.596 5.531 5.469 5.566
Gap 0.217 -0.126 -0.425 -0.152 0.252 0.453 0.065 0.126 0.028
C2. Outcomes Homosexuals with Heterosexuals Observables
Employed
Income 5.38 5.432 5.426 5.441 5.368 5.47 5.422 5.388 5.453
Gap 0.39 0.277 -0.135 -0.302 -0.131 0.183 0.088 0.146 0.049
Full Time
Income 5.607 5.572 5.564 5.467 5.385 5.551 5.509 5.447 5.556
Gap 0.335 0.108 -0.208 -0.248 0.039 0.245 0.087 0.148 0.038
Continued on next page
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Table 3.13 – continued from previous page
No College College Overall
SI SP SX+ SI SP SX+ SI SP SX+
C3. Outcomes Homosexuals with Heterosexuals Observables & Unobservables
Employed
Income 4.941 5.385 5.295 5.677 5.404 5.628 5.441 5.398 5.5
Gap 0.445 0.27 -0.133 -0.376 -0.134 0.135 0.069 0.136 0.002
Full Time
Income 5.459 5.557 5.517 5.552 5.405 5.600 5.524 5.456 5.568
Gap 0.369 0.107 -0.195 -0.297 0.031 0.221 0.072 0.139 0.026
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The results in panel B of Table 3.13 show that the estimated income gaps faced
by sexual minorities range from around 5% to 15%, depending on the sample and
on the homosexuality definition used. In general, the largest gaps are estimated
among the college educated workers. In fact, in the case of SP and SX+ definitions
of homosexuality, the income differences among college educated workers contribute
positively to the overall gap, while the income differences among those that did not
go to college contribute negatively to the overall gap.23 Although these two opposing
effects counter each other, the gaps faced by college educated homosexuals outweigh
the income advantage that homosexuals that did not go to college have. Interestingly,
the income differences estimated under the SI homosexuality definition work differ-
ently. SI homosexuals face income differences of between 8.4% overall, and the main
driver of those differences is the the gaps faced by those who did not attend tertiary
education. This responds to the fact that while homosexuals under other definitions
are always less likely to have tertiary education than heterosexuals, SI homosexuals
are much more likely to do so than SI heterosexuals (see Table 3.14).
In general, the definition that reports the largest income difference is SP, for
which the income differences between homosexuals and heterosexuals is of 15% in the
employed sample and 14.4% among full time workers. On the other had, the tightest
definition of homosexuality is the one that report the smallest income differences
ranging between 5% and 8.4%.
23 Even though both college educated and not college educated homosexuals face income gaps
against them, the gap faced in each sector contributes in different directions because of the differences
in college attendance between homosexuals and heterosexuals. Table 3.14 shows that SP and SX+
homosexuals are less likely to go to college than heterosexuals.
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B.2 Homosexuals (Equalizing Gender)
0.6548 0.6151 0.5646
C.1 Homosexuals with Heterosexuals
Unobservables
0.6521 0.6262 0.5705
C.2 Homosexuals with Heterosexuals
Observables
0.6648 0.6699 0.61
C.3 Homosexuals with Heterosexuals
Unobservables & Observables
0.647 0.6695 0.6087
Panel C.1 presents the simulation results where homosexuals have been given








results show that equalizing skills across groups reduces the income gaps against
homosexuals. The extent of that reduction depends on the homosexuality definition
used. There are larger reduction in the gap for SI and SX+ homosexuals than for
SP homosexuals. For instance, the gap faced by the employed SI homosexuals falls
from 8.4% to 4.4%, and those employed in full time occupations would see their
income gap drop from 8.4% to 6.5%. The income difference against SX+ full time
employed homosexuals would go down to by 2.1 percentage points (from 4.9% to
2.8%), and among the employed sample, it would be reduced to a fourth of what
it is (from 8.4% to 2.1%). The main driver of all these reductions in the overall
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income differences is the increase in income among college educated homosexuals
that would result from them having their skills drawn from the skills distribution
of their heterosexual counterparts. Furthermore, panel C1 of Table 3.14 indicates
that equalizing skill distributions does not affect average tertiary education take-up.
Hence all the difference in gaps presented in Table 3.13 respond to changes in the
differences in income and not difference in sorting.
Panel C.2 shows the contribution of observable characteristics in determining in-
come differences. Panel C.2 shows that when homosexuals are given heterosexuals







), the income gaps remain mostly
unchanged. Only the SX+ homosexuals would see their gaps fall in this scenario,
and the gap reduction is smaller than what would happen if homosexuals were given
skills taken from the heterosexuals’ skills distribution. Different reasons explain the
lack of change in the gaps that SI and SP homosexuals would face after receiving het-
erosexuals’ observables. While in the case of SI homosexuals education-specific gaps
and college take-up would remain unchanged, for SP homosexuals education-specific
gaps and tertiary education take-up would be adjusted. In particular, providing SP
homosexuals with heterosexual observable characteristics would cause a small income
increase among those that did not go to college, while it would reduce the income
earned by those who went to college. These effects would be amplified by 5.5 per-
centage points increase in the likelihood of going to college. This new sorting would
cause all the gains and losses to cancel each other out leaving overall gaps almost
unchanged.
Providing SX+ homosexuals with heterosexuals observable characteristics would
cause an improvement of the conditions for the college educated ones. It would make
150
SX+ college educated homosexuals earn almost as much as heterosexuals. Although
there is a deterioration income differences non-college educated SX+ homosexuals
face, it would not be enough to offset the gains among the college educated ones. In
addition, panel C.2 in Table 3.14 shows that SX+ homosexuals would also have a
significant gain in the likelihood of going to college.
Finally, panel C.3 shows the counterfactuals when homosexuals are given both








ingly, the changes in the gaps presented in panel C.3 are a combination of the ones
presented in panels C1 and C2. In consequence, there would be a smaller reduction
in the gaps in wider definitions of homosexuality than in the strictest definition of it.
That is because while changing skill endowments of SI and SP homosexuals would
reduce the gaps, changing the observables characteristics would not. On the other
hand, both changes work in the same direction for the SX+ homosexuals. Therefore,
joint changes of skill endowments and observable characteristics reach deeper income
gaps reductions. So while these gaps would be now of the order of 7% for SI homo-
sexuals and 13% for SP homosexuals, they would range between 0.2% and 2.6% for
the SX+ ones.
3.5.6.2 Model With Occupational Choice
Now, I turn to the model with occupational choice. Table 3.15 shows the income
differences that arise from different counterfactual simulation exercises. Notice that
workers in white collar occupations earn significantly more than workers in blue collar
occupations. This will be an important driver of the income gaps faced by members
of sexual minorities because, as can be seen in Table 3.16, they tend to prefer white
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collar occupations significantly less than heterosexual workers. Therefore, any changes
than boost homosexual take-up of white collar occupations will have a big impact in
reducing the income gaps they face.
The results in Table 3.15 show that the existing overall income gaps range between
10% and 15% when taking into account occupational choices. This matches with the
overall income gaps estimated by the model with education choice in Table 3.13.24 As
in the case of the models with education choices, these results show smaller gaps for
the most strict definition of homosexuality. Although the income differences against
members of sexual minorities within each type of occupation are not that different,
their reduced participation in white collar occupations compared to heterosexuals (see
Table 3.16) amplify the income gaps homosexuals face in this type of occupations,
which end up contributing to the overall gap with 27% to 57%.
Panel C1 in Table 3.15 shows that equalizing the distributions of skills would
make homosexuals in white collar occupations earn more, however it would also affect
the sorting into this type of occupations making them even less likely to opt into
them. Hence, the overall gaps increase for the wider definitions of homosexuality.
For SX+ homosexuals, on the other hand, the effects of equalizing skill distributions
differ depending on the sample. Among the employed population, the increase in
income that homosexual white collar workers would enjoy would not be enough to
reduce the overall gap because it is not enough to offset the effect of the fall in white
collar occupations take-up by homosexuals. On the other hand, homosexual full time
workers would see an income increase of 30% which is able to compensate the fact
that less SX+ homosexuals are opting into white collar occupations. Hence for this
24 Small discrepancies in the estimated overall gaps could have been expected as the two models
use different samples. That is because 15% of the observations with positive income do not report
their ISCO88 occupation code.
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population, the overall income gaps would disappear.
Panel C2 shows the effect of equalizing observable characteristics. It shows that
although the incomes generated in each type of occupation would not differ from
the actual ones, giving homosexuals the observable characteristics of heterosexuals
would boost sorting into white collar occupations, even surpassing the actual take
up of heterosexuals. This new sorting into higher paying occupations would shift the
overall income differences dramatically. In this scenario, homosexuals would not face
income gaps agains them, instead they would have an advantage over heterosexual
workers that would range from 33% to 50%.
Panel C3 Table 3.16 shows that, when homosexuals are given heterosexuals’ ob-
servable and unobservable characteristics, there would also be a different sorting into
occupations that would increase the proportion of homosexuals in white collar jobs.
As it was shown in panel C2 of Table 3.15, this new sorting is due to changes in
the observable characteristics. In consequence, under this scenario also, homosexuals
would have an advantage over heterosexual workers in terms of income earned.
All the evidence presented in Table 3.15 indicates that occupational choice are
key in determining income differences agains members of sexual minorities. Although
they earn less regardless of the occupation, their preference for blue collar occupa-
tions exacerbate the income gaps. This preference is closely linked to observable
characteristics, that once modified make more homosexuals sort into white collar oc-
cupations causing overall income gaps to disappear. Interestingly, giving unobserved
skills to homosexuals form the skills distribution of heterosexuals would increase their
income earned in white collar occupations, but would not modify the proportion of
homosexuals preferring blue collar occupations.
153
Tab. 3.15: Heterosexual and Homosexual ln Annual Income Under Different Assumptions,
By Occupation
Blue Collar White Collar Overall
SI SP SX+ SI SP SX+ SI SP SX+
A. Outcomes Heterosexuals
Employed 5.448 5.441 5.425 5.631 5.619 5.616 5.558 5.549 5.542
Full Time 5.585 5.536 5.525 5.662 5.655 5.646 5.631 5.608 5.599
B1. Outcomes Homosexuals
Employed 5.193 5.227 5.356 5.551 5.526 5.512 5.405 5.391 5.438
Full Time 5.33 5.385 5.442 5.605 5.509 5.531 5.493 5.453 5.489
Gap
Employed 0.062 -0.213 -0.424 0.09 0.371 0.528 0.153 0.158 0.104
Full Time 0.061 -0.247 -0.426 0.077 0.402 0.536 0.138 0.155 0.11
B2. Outcomes Homosexuals (Equalizing Gender)
Employed 5.19 5.243 5.378 5.599 5.562 5.502 5.417 5.413 5.443
Full Time 5.350 5.399 5.471 5.622 5.49 5.507 5.501 5.447 5.49
Gap (Equalizing Gender)
Employed -0.13 -0.316 -0.46 0.271 0.452 0.559 0.141 0.136 0.099
Full Time -0.146 -0.352 -0.465 0.276 0.512 0.574 0.13 0.161 0.109
C1. Outcomes Homosexuals with Heterosexuals Unobservables
Employed
Income 4.559 5.084 5.103 5.63 5.627 5.74 5.135 5.362 5.428
Gap 0.069 -0.342 -0.387 0.354 0.529 0.501 0.423 0.187 0.114
Full Time
Income 5.337 5.397 5.476 5.772 5.575 5.855 5.569 5.488 5.671
Gap -0.258 -0.452 -0.509 0.319 0.571 0.437 0.062 0.12 -0.072
C2. Outcomes Homosexuals with Heterosexuals Observables
Employed
Income 5.289 5.239 5.341 5.522 5.485 5.445 5.889 6.007 6.058
Gap -0.269 -0.417 -0.504 -0.063 -0.04 -0.013 -0.331 -0.458 -0.516
Full Time
Income 5.411 5.418 5.478 5.526 5.449 5.432 5.97 6.061 6.09
Gap -0.292 -0.462 -0.51 -0.046 0.009 0.019 -0.339 -0.453 -0.491
Continued on next page
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Table 3.15 – continued from previous page
Blue Collar White Collar Overall
SI SP SX+ SI SP SX+ SI SP SX+
C3. Outcomes Homosexuals with Heterosexuals Observables & Unobservables
Employed
Income 4.719 5.164 5.168 5.549 5.509 5.55 5.56 5.908 5.973
Gap -0.005 -0.381 -0.419 0.004 0.022 -0.013 -0.002 -0.359 -0.431
Full Time
Income 5.401 5.412 5.488 5.628 5.481 5.58 5.95 6.001 6.121
Gap -0.287 -0.459 -0.515 -0.031 0.066 -0.008 -0.319 -0.393 -0.522
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B.2 Homosexuals (Equalizing Gender)
0.5569 0.5324 0.5200
C.1 Homosexuals with Heterosexuals
Unobservables
0.5378 0.5122 0.5107
C.2 Homosexuals with Heterosexuals
Observables
0.6236 0.6307 0.6322




This chapter of the dissertation incorporates differences in skill distributions, observ-
able characteristics and tastes for schooling and occupations into the analysis and
quantification of the income gaps observed against non-heterosexual workers. The re-
sults from the model indicate that there are in fact differences in the the distribution
of unobserved skills and observed characteristics between homosexual and heterosex-
ual workers. These traits work different for sexual preference groups. That is, they
have different effects on education and educational choices, as well as different re-
turn in terms of income. In particular, while skills have a stronger effect on sorting
into tertiary education and white collar occupations for heterosexuals, skills are more
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rewarded in terms of income among homosexuals than among heterosexuals. In addi-
tion, observed characteristics are strong determinants of the difference in occupation
choices observed between sexual preference groups. All these results indicate that
there are several forces working simultaneously in opening the income gaps observed.
The findings of this Chapter indicate that, assuming that tastes for occupational
choices remain unaltered, differences in skill distributions are more important than
differences in observable characteristics between sexual preference groups in explain-
ing the income gaps homosexuals face. That is because although equalizing skills
distributions would be unable to reduce the differences in sorting into college and
white collar occupations, it would increase college educated homosexuals’ income
proportionally more.
Also, this Chapter shows Norwegian white collar occupations pay significantly
more than blue collar ones. Hence, the determinants of taste for white collar oc-
cupations are very important in determining annual income. My findings indicate
that—leaving occupational choices unaltered—observable characteristics are key de-
terminants of the occupational choices of homosexuals. Therefore, equalizing these
traits to those of heterosexuals would increase the take-up of white collar occupations
by members of sexual minorities. The take-up increase is so large that under this
scenario homosexuals would be more likely than heterosexuals to work in white collar
occupations. The new sorting would cause income gaps to disappear and, in fact,
it would yield a labor market where homosexuals have an income advantage over
heterosexuals.
This is the first work to incorporate endogenous decisions and unobserved skills in
the analysis of income discrimination agains homosexuals. My results show that all of
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these elements are of great importance and that closing gaps in traits and tastes for
occupations would significantly reduce the income gaps non-heterosexuals currently
face. This topic, of great importance as barriers against sexual minorities continue
to fall in other aspects of life, need further analysis. Although the YiN data set used
in this Chapter is a great source of information for these topics, the research commu-
nity would benefit from data sources with a greater sample size. More observations
are needed to incorporate education and occupational choices simultaneously in one
model, and in that way be able to jointly analyze the two effects above exposed.
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APPENDICES
G Descriptive Statistics of Outcomes
Tab. G.1: Descriptive Statistics of Outcome and Treatment Variables
Outcome Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
At t = 2
Bullied 0.1119 0.3153 0 1
Bully 0.0777 0.2677 0 1
Cyberbully 0.2827 0.4503 0 1
Criminal 0.1249 0.3307 0 1
Cybercriminal 0.1276 0.3337 0 1
At t = 5
Depression 15.416 4.524 6 30
Drinking 0.7213 0.4483 0 1
Smoking 0.1907 0.3929 0 1
Life Satisfaction 0.4772 0.4995 0 1
Sick 0.0735 0.2611 0 1
Mental Issues 0.0315 0.1749 0 1
Stressed Image 10.644 3.6013 4 20
Stressed Total 45.471 11.354 17 85
Tab. G.2: Descriptive Statistics of Outcome Variables
Variable Obs Mean Std.0Dev. Min Max Variable Obs Mean Std.0Dev. Min Max
Depression 2833 15.4168 4.524 6 30 Volunteer 3449 0.1032 0.3042 0 1
Drinking 3449 0.7213 0.4483 0 1 Beh0Problems3449 0.1249 0.3307 0 1
Smoking 3449 0.1907 0.3929 0 1 Bullied 3188 0.1119 0.3153 0 1
Life0Satisfa 3449 0.4772 0.4995 0 1
Variable Obs Mean Std.0Dev. Min Max Variable Obs Mean Std.0Dev. Min Max
Depression 1348 14.566 4.4594 6 30 Volunteer 1725 0.0794 0.2704 0 1
Drinking 1725 0.6904 0.4624 0 1 Beh0Problems1725 0.1426 0.3497 0 1
Smoking 1725 0.2846 0.4513 0 1 Bullied 1594 0.1373 0.3443 0 1
Life0Satisfa 1725 0.5002 0.5001 0 1
Variable Obs Mean Std.0Dev. Min Max Variable Obs Mean Std.0Dev. Min Max
Depression 1485 16.1892 4.4444 6 29 Volunteer 1724 0.127 0.3331 0 1
Drinking 1724 0.7523 0.4317 0 1 Beh0Problems1724 0.1073 0.3095 0 1
Smoking 1724 0.0968 0.2958 0 1 Bullied 1594 0.0865 0.2812 0 1
Life0Satisfa 1724 0.4541 0.498 0 1
Variable Obs Mean Std.0Dev. Min Max Variable Obs Mean Std.0Dev. Min Max
Depression 1954 15.3756 4.4583 6 30 Life0Satisfa 1954 0.6084 0.4882 0 1
Drinking 1954 0.9002 0.2998 0 1 Volunteer 1954 0.1606 0.3673 0 1
Smoking 1954 0.196 0.397 0 1
Variable Obs Mean Std.0Dev. Min Max Variable Obs Mean Std.0Dev. Min Max
Depression 879 15.5085 4.6679 6 30 Life0Satisfa 1495 0.3056 0.4608 0 1
Drinking 1495 0.4876 0.5 0 1 Volunteer 1495 0.028 0.1652 0 1







H Variance Decomposition of Test Scores, Orthogonal Skills Model
Fig. H.1: Variance Decomposition of Test Scores




























I Information Used to create Non-cognitive score
In the case of locus of control, we added three questions:
1. I have confidence in my own decision
2. I believe that I can deal with my problems by myself
3. I am taking full responsibility of my own life
To create the self-esteem index we added:
1. I think that I have a good character
2. I think that I am a competent person
3. I think that I am a worthy person
4. Sometimes I think that I am a worthless person (the negative of)
5. Sometimes I think that I am a bad person (the negative of)
6. I generally feel that I am a failure in life (the negative of)
7. If I do something wrong, people around me will blame me much (the negative
of)
8. If I do something wrong, I will be put to shame by people around me (the
negative of)
Finally we created the irresponsibility index by adding:
1. I jump into exciting things even if I have to take an examination tomorrow
2. I abandon a task once it becomes hard and laborious to do
3. I am apt to enjoy risky activities
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J Attrition Analysis
In this Appendix, I present some estimations regarding the observations lost due to
attrition in the data set used in Chapters 1 and 2. First, Table J.1 shows that attrition
in the first three waves is relatively low compared with similar surveys.
Tab. J.1: Attrition by Wave
Attrit. Attr. if Bull in t = 1
Wave No Yes
1 · · ·
2 7.5% 7.7% 7%
3 9.4% 9.1% 10.4%
4 9.5% 9.1% 11%
5 13.9% 13.7% 14.8%
In addition, Tables J.2 and J.3 show that there are few differences between those
who leave the sample and those who stay. The only observable characteristics in
which the attrited and the non-attrited subsamples differ are income, the proportion
of fathers with graduate school and two of the cognitive tests. These differences are
significant at the 90% confidence level. It is important to note that there are no
statistical differences between the subsamples according to bullying perpetration or
victimization. In Table J.3, I incorporate the unobservables (i.e., cognitive and non-
cognitive skills) in the analysis. It shows that, consistent with the findings in Table
J.2, the kids that leave the sample are low cognitive skilled wealthy kids with highly
educated parents.
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Tab. J.2: Difference in Observables at t = 1 of Attrited and Non-Attrited Observations
Variable Mean Att Mean Stay Diff.
Age (months) 8.6346 8.9626 -.328
Male .5019 .5 .0019
Older Siblings .4559 .5452 -.0893*
Young Siblings .6398 .6341 .0058
lnInc_pc 4.5632 4.3275 .2356*
Urban .8659 .8676 -.0017
Lives: Both Parents .9195 .9294 -.0099
Lives: Only Mother .0383 .0332 .0051
Father Edu: 2yColl .0728 .0678 .005
Father Edu: 4yColl .295 .2974 -.0023
Father Edu: GS .1341 .063 .0711*
Locus of Control .0631 -.0052 .0682
Irresponsibility -.0827 .0068 -.0895
Self-Esteem .0068 -.0006 .0074
Language & SocStd -.0907 .0074 -.0981
Math & Science -.1457 .0119 -.1576*
Yearly Test -.108 .009 -.117*
Bullied .2107 .2262 -.0154
Bully .2759 .2437 .0321
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Tab. J.3: Probability of Staying from t = 1 to t = 2
Raw Coefficients
Stay in Wave 2 Coeff. StdErr.
Age (months) 0.0092 (0.010)
Male -0.0004 (0.072)
Older Siblings 0.0531 (0.070)
Young Siblings -0.0287 (0.070)
lnInc_pc -0.3089*** (0.068)
Urban 0.1250 (0.106)
Lives: Both Parents 0.1375 (0.209)
Lives: Only Mother -0.1876 (0.273)
Father Edu: 2yColl -0.0036 (0.146)
Father Edu: 4yColl -0.0727 (0.085)





*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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K Proofs
K.1 Proof Theorem 1
Organize the adjunct measurement system (3.3) such that the subset of measures
affected only by ✓A remain on the top LA rows and the rest of the measures remain
in the bottom LA,B = L   LA rows. That way, we can partition the measurement









XT T + ↵(A)A✓A + eT
XT T + ↵(A,B)A✓A + ↵(A,B)B✓B + eT
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Therefore, LA   1 factor loadings are identified up to one normalization. Also, as-



















Now turning to the second block of the measurement system and assuming that latent













































for m = 1, . . . , LB and l = 1, . . . , LA. It is easy to see that this second block of the
measurement system is not identified as it has 2LB + 2 unknowns, while it has only
2LB pieces of relevant information. That is, I have two loadings per measure plus
 2✓B and  ✓A,✓B to identify, and I have two covariances per each LB tests: one with
another second block test and another one with one the LA test (preferably, the one
that has the normalized loading).
Now, let me reduce the number of unknowns by normalizing one of the second
block loadings (i.e., ↵(A,B)Bo = 1 for o = {1, .., LB}) and assuming one of the second































=  ✓A,✓B . Then, using (K.3) and (K.4), I can identify
↵(A,B)Am and ↵(A,B)Bm as a function of measurement covariances and  2✓B , which I can
later identify using equation (K.1).
K.2 Proof Theorem 2
To simplify exposition let us reduce the number of parameters to two, and rename ⇢
as  2. Hence, the parameter set is   = { 1,  2}. Assuming separability of the error
term function to estimate is








I linearize the CES function using a Taylor approximation around  0 in order to rely
on the results of the linearized regression model described in Green (2000). That is,
if ✓0k = @h (✓t, ) /@ 0k





   01✓01    02✓02 +  1✓01 +  2✓02






   0✓0 +  ✓0 + "
Defining "0 as the error term that contains the true disturbance " and the deviation





which can be estimated using least squares. Given that I am particularly interested














From the Frisch-Waugh theorem we now that  ̂2 can be obtained by regressing the
residuals from the regression between ✓0t+1 and ✓01 on the residuals from the regression


























1 is the annihilator matrix of the regression of ✓0t+1












































































Therefore the, bias in  ̂2 depends on the mean of "0 which in turn depends on the
mean of ✓t+1 trough ". Hence, the only way E [ ̂2] =  2 is if E [✓t+1] = 0.
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L Information used to create the measures of investment in
non-cognitive skills
In the creation of the non-cognitive investment measures I used several variables and
combined them in three indexes, namely parental abuse, parental control and parental
harmony.
The parental abuse index is an aggregation of the following variables:
• I frequently see my parents verbally abuse each other
• I frequently see one of my parents beat the other one
• I am often verbally abused by parents
• I am often severely beaten by parents
The parental control index is created by aggregating:
• When I go out, my parents usually know where I am
• When I go out, my parents usually know whom I am with
• When I go out, my parents usually know what I do
• When I go out, my parents usually know when I return
Finally, the parental harmony index is created using the following variables:
• My parents and I try to spend much time together
• My parents always treat me with love and affection
• My parents and I understand each other well
• My parents and I candidly talk about everything
• I frequently talk about my thoughts and what I experience away from home
with my parents
• My parents and I have frequent conversations
Tab. L.1: Descriptive Statistics of Investment Indexes
Parental Abuse Parental Control Parental Harmony
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
All 7.1641 3.157 0.002 0.997 0 0.999
Males 7.1627 3.094 -0.118 0.983 -0.086 0.963
Females 7.1654 3.219 0.124 0.997 0.085 1.025
Attending College⇤ 6.8914 3.008 0.038 1.012 0.036 0.969
Not Attending College⇤ 7.5211 3.309 -0.043 0.098 -0.048 1.034
⇤ Sample limited to wave 6
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M Outcomes Analysis at age 16
In this Appendix I present some results that help understand the impacts found in
the Chapter 2 using understandable metrics. I estimate the following specification:
Y = XY  
Y + ↵Y,NC✓NC + ↵Y,C✓C + eY
Its purpose is to capture the effect of skills on more tangible outcomes, and in that
way have a better picture about how the skills lost to bullying hurt the development
of successful lives. See Chapter 1 for a detailed explanation on how the outcome
measures were constructed.
Tab. M.1: Effect of unobserved heterogeneity at age 16
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Probit
VARIABLES College LifeSatisf Healthy Smoke Drink
Age (months) 0.0040 0.0139 0.0079 -0.0002 -0.0125*
(0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007)
Male -0.3658*** 0.3862*** 0.0930* 0.4307*** -0.0347
(0.057) (0.093) (0.054) (0.074) (0.052)
Older Siblings -0.0005 0.1973** 0.0333 -0.0918 -0.0197
(0.054) (0.082) (0.052) (0.068) (0.051)
Young Siblings 0.0405 0.1529* -0.0233 -0.1841** -0.0967*
(0.055) (0.082) (0.053) (0.073) (0.051)
lnInc_pc 0.0811 0.3043*** 0.1302** 0.0366 -0.1029**
(0.056) (0.088) (0.053) (0.067) (0.052)
Urban -0.1443* 0.0536 -0.1025 0.1205 -0.0566
(0.086) (0.118) (0.079) (0.108) (0.077)
Lives: Both Parents 0.3620*** 0.0954 0.3392*** -0.3425** -0.3686***
(0.132) (0.190) (0.130) (0.147) (0.120)
Lives: Only Mother 0.2993 0.3979 0.2900 0.1326 0.0274
(0.185) (0.269) (0.180) (0.196) (0.168)
Father Edu: 2yColl 0.1782 0.2736* -0.2132** -0.4097** -0.1278
(0.119) (0.161) (0.104) (0.164) (0.103)
Father Edu: 4yColl -0.0196 0.2157** -0.0199 -0.1406* -0.0358
(0.068) (0.099) (0.064) (0.084) (0.062)
Father Edu: GS -0.1255 0.5521*** 0.0177 -0.4167** -0.1610
(0.125) (0.200) (0.120) (0.187) (0.122)
ParentWantsColl 0.6257*** 0.1989 0.0858 -0.2264** -0.0391
(0.090) (0.136) (0.090) (0.107) (0.087)
ParentWantsGS 0.5497*** 0.2426 0.0218 -0.2332 -0.0226
(0.115) (0.172) (0.112) (0.143) (0.109)
Non-Cogs -0.0726 3.5356*** 1.0919*** -0.6746*** -0.5552***
(0.169) (0.676) (0.190) (0.231) (0.163)
Cognitive 0.0893** -0.2060*** -0.1937*** -0.1479*** -0.0570
(0.041) (0.077) (0.043) (0.045) (0.037)
Constant -0.4744 -2.1872*** -1.0961*** -1.0815*** 0.7336***
(0.296) (0.502) (0.291) (0.357) (0.276)
Observations 2,345 2,685 2,685 2,685 2,685
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Tab. M.2: Effect of unobserved heterogeneity at age 16
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
LS
VARIABLES Depression StressImage StressFiends StressSchool StressTotal
Age (months) -0.0009 0.0045 0.0054 -0.0023 0.0023
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Male -0.2526*** -0.3412*** 0.0875** -0.2591*** -0.1685***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.037) (0.037)
Older Siblings -0.0094 0.0224 0.0463 0.0641* 0.0408
(0.036) (0.036) (0.038) (0.036) (0.036)
Young Siblings -0.0013 -0.0172 0.0492 0.0726** 0.0284
(0.036) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037)
lnInc_pc 0.0073 -0.0139 0.0330 0.0574 0.0319
(0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037)
Urban -0.0354 -0.0007 -0.1488*** 0.1336** 0.0273
(0.054) (0.055) (0.057) (0.055) (0.055)
Lives: Both Parents -0.0692 -0.1907** -0.1186 0.1786** -0.0420
(0.088) (0.088) (0.091) (0.088) (0.088)
Lives: Only Mother -0.0950 -0.3407*** -0.2475* -0.0591 -0.3171***
(0.121) (0.123) (0.127) (0.122) (0.123)
Father Edu: 2yColl 0.0093 0.0032 0.0091 0.1268* 0.0910
(0.072) (0.072) (0.075) (0.072) (0.073)
Father Edu: 4yColl 0.0272 -0.0990** -0.0505 0.0910** 0.0013
(0.044) (0.044) (0.046) (0.044) (0.044)
Father Edu: GS -0.0339 -0.2672*** -0.1435 0.0037 -0.1677**
(0.084) (0.085) (0.087) (0.084) (0.085)
ParentWantsColl 0.0237 0.0287 -0.0082 0.4518*** 0.1969***
(0.061) (0.062) (0.064) (0.062) (0.062)
ParentWantsGS 0.1340* 0.0805 0.0956 0.5739*** 0.3283***
(0.077) (0.078) (0.081) (0.078) (0.078)
Non-Cogs -1.9588*** -1.5315*** -1.2128*** -1.3627*** -1.7103***
(0.111) (0.110) (0.114) (0.104) (0.106)
Cognitive 0.2313*** 0.1870*** 0.1199*** 0.1079*** 0.1391***
(0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026)
Constant 0.1578 0.3884* -0.0374 -0.9150*** -0.2890
(0.196) (0.199) (0.205) (0.197) (0.198)
Observations 2,685 2,676 2,678 2,678 2,654
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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N Additional Tables and Graphs of Chapter 3
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Age
95% CI No College College
Note: Local polynomial regressions of (ln) annual income for employed
population and age.
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